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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
AN AFTER TAX ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF HOME 
EQUITY CONVERSION FOR THE ELDERLY
by
Lowell James Cramer 
Florida International University, 1994 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Lewis F. Davidson, Major Professor
The FHA program to insure reverse mortgages has brought 
additional attention to the use of home equity conversion to 
increase income to the elderly* Using simulation, this study 
compares the economic consequences of the FHA reverse mortgage 
with two alternative conversion vehicles: sale of a remainder
interest and sale-leaseback. An FHA insured plan is devised 
for each vehicle, structured to represent fair substitutes for 
the FHA mortgage* In addition, the FHA mortgage is adjusted 
to allow for a 4 percent annual increase in distributions to 
the homeowner* The viability of each plan for the homeowner, 
the financial institution and the FHA is investigated using
different assumptions for house appreciation, tax rates, and 
homeowners1 initial ages. For the homeowner, the return of 
each vehicle is compared with the choice of not employing home 
equity conversion. The study examines the impact of tax and 
accounting rules on the selection of alternatives. The study 
investigates the sensitivity of the FHA model to some of its 
assumptions.
Although none of the vehicles is Pareato optimal, the 
study shows that neither the sale of a remainder interest nor 
the sale-leaseback is a viable alternative vehicle to the 
homeowner. While each of these vehicles is profitable to the 
financial institution, the profits are not high enough to 
transfer benefits to the homeowner and still be workable. The 
effects of tax rate, house appreciation rate, and homeowner's 
initial age are surprisingly small. As a general rule, none 
of these factors materially impact the decision of either the 
homeowner or the financial institution. Tax and accounting 
rules were found to have minimal impact on the selection of 
vehicles. The sensitivity analysis indicates that none of the 
variables studied alone is likely to materially affect the 
FHA1s profitability.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The growth of the elderly population in the United 
States1 has focused attention on the financial plight of the 
aged. During this era of large budget deficits, home equity 
conversion, the use of a person's home equity to increase 
funds available for retirement2, allows the elderly to 
consume annually from the value of their real estate without 
government outlay. Although home equity conversions ("HEC"s) 
date from the 1970's (Archer and Nye 1987, 1), they had not 
gained widespread attention until the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development ("HUD") started providing Federal 
Housing Administration ("FHA")3 insurance for home equity 
conversion mortgages ("HECM,!s) 4. In 1987 Congress authorized
In 1930, the elderly (those over age 65) represented 5.4 
percent of the U.S. population. In 1980, the percentage 
increased to 11.3 percent. In 2030, the elderly are expected 
to constitute 21.8 percent of the population. (U.S. Senate 
Subcommittee on Aging et al. 1991, 7).
2 This is a narrow definition. Under a broader 
definition, home equity conversion would also include standard 
home equity mortgages used as lines of credit by working 
individuals.
3 Throughout this paper HUD and FHA will be used 
interchangeably *
4HECMs are commonly called reverse mortgages. This paper 
will use the two terms interchangeably.
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a demonstration project in which HUD could insure 2,500 HECMs 
through September 30, 1991 (HUD 1990, 1-3). This program was 
later increased to allow 25 thousand HECMs through September 
30, 1995 (Roma 1991).
The objective of this study is to evaluate the need for 
the FHA to insure additional forms of home equity conversion, 
namely a growth mortgage, split interest plan, and a sale- 
leaseback. These vehicles are discussed in chapter 2. There 
are five major issues relating to the objective:
• The expected economic consequences to the 
homeowner;
• The expected economic consequences to the financial 
institution;
• The expected economic consequence to the FHA;
• Suggested legislative changes by the government? 
and
• Accounting problems relating to these proposals. 
The study compares the costs and benefits of these additional 
vehicles to the FHA HECM mortgage. In general, the net 
present value of expected cash flow is used to measure the 
results, but other measures are used. To date there has been 
no study comparing the costs and benefits of these alternative 
HEC vehicles.
Interest in home equity conversion is extremely strong. 
For example, FHA received 28 thousand inquiries on the HECM 
project in the interval before the start of the program (HUD 
1990, p. 1-5) . Actual demand has been less than expressed
2
interest. Prior to the FHA program, only about 2,500 HECMs 
had been written, one thousand by a single private issuer and 
the reminder by government or nonprofit organizations (HUD 
1990, p. 3-1) . In the first nine months of operation, lenders 
took only 572 FHA HECM mortgage applications and only 257 
loans were closed. This led one critic (Sichelman 1991) to 
note that at that rate, the 25 thousand mortgage limit would 
not be exceeded for fifty years.
While the HECM mortgage is designed to give the homeowner 
a monthly payment, not generally indexed for inflation, the 
split interest ("SI") and the sale-leaseback (11SL") can result 
in lower monthly payments, but provide inflation protection. 
HECMs, SLs, and Sis are described in chapter 2. It is 
possible that the elderly homeowner may be as interested in 
inflation protection as current cash receipts. A comparison 
of the three models shows the advantages and disadvantages to 
the homeowner, the financial institution and the insurer 
(FHA).
This research uses Monte Carlo simulation to compare the 
FHA HECM mortgage with similarly constructed and insured split 
SI and SL arrangements and a growth HECM mortgage. Simulation 
is used because there are a large number of variables, some of 
which act differently in different situations* The FHA does 
not presently insure the SI, SL, or growth HECM mortgages. 
The research examines the economic effects on the homeowner,
3
the financial institution and the FHA on before- and after-tax 
bases assuming different ages and property appreciation rates. 
It examines the accounting flows of the different 
alternatives, to learn whether current and future cash flows 
are reflected. In addition, the financial viability of the 
FHA model and the sensitivity of the model to several of its 
assumptions are explored.
The outcome of this research should provide homeowners 
and financial institutions information to better compare the 
four forms of HEC being examined. A second purpose is to 
examine certain policy aspects of the plans. Additionally, 
information is provided to the insurer regarding the economic 
viability of the plans. The reason for testing the FHA plan 
is to learn whether the plan is likely to break even.
This research should be of interest to those 
organizations and governmental agencies interested in 
promoting home equity conversion for the elderly. It will 
provide information to assess the usefulness of expanding the 
FHA HEC (or the establishment of private programs) to include 
one or more of the three model plans. Moreover, this research 
should be useful to the FHA for determining whether it can 
carry out any of the three alternative plans without loss of 
revenue or without adverse selection risk*5 Private
5For example, if plan A is more favorable than plan B to 
the FHA given low appreciation rates, but plan B is more 
favorable given high appreciation rates, homeowners and
4
companies should find this research useful in deciding whether 
to offer their own HEC plan or to insure the HEC plans of 
others.
Accounting rules may have economic consequences that 
discourage financial institutions from offering the plans. To 
maintain regulatory capital and earnings, financial 
institutions, such as banks, will often be suffer reduced cash 
flows to increase reported profits (Scholes, Wilson and 
Wolfson 1989). If either the split interest or sale-leaseback 
plan is adopted, accounting rules may have to be modified to 
allow for the insured nature of the plans. This is a concern 
to special interest groups interested in promoting home equity 
conversion* For example the SEC's decision to change the 
accounting for non-insured HECMs in 1992 was questioned by the 
American Association of Retired Persons ("AARP”).
This research is of interest from a tax perspective 
because
it examines the effect of taxes on HEC choices of 
the homeowner and the financial institution;
• it examines for policy makers the need to change 
the tax law and regulations to encourage new forms 
of HEC? and
• it aids homeowners and financial institutions in 
evaluating the HEC choices on an after-tax basis*
institutions may be encouraged to use plan B if the property 
is unlikely to appreciate and use plan A if the property is 
likely to appreciate.
5
This research does not examine the legal requirements for 
each type of HEC under state or federal laws. It assumes that 
each type of procedure is legal or can be made legal by 
appropriate legislation or ruling. For example, it is likely 
that banks and other financial institutions (other than 
insurance companies) are not presently allowed to issue 
annuities. This research assumes that a program to increase 
HECs would include authorization for financial institutions to 
issue annuities with a qualified HEC.
The remainder of this paper is divided into the following 
chapters:
Background and perspective;
Methodology?
Results; and 
Conclusion.
The conclusion includes (1) a summary, (2) public policy 
recommendations, and (3) research limitations, including areas 
for further research.
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVE 
Home equity conversion is broadly defined as the use of 
home equity (i.e., the value of the home) to provide cash to 
the homeowner. A traditional home equity loan meets this 
broad definition. However, it is defined more narrowly in 
this research to include only those home equity conversion 
vehicles ("HEC's) that are designed to provide additional cash 
flows for elderly homeowners, to enable them to continue to 
live in their present (or desired future home) without fear of 
being forced out. The three principal forms of HEC are the 
home equity conversion mortgage6 ("HECM"), the split interest 
("SI"), and the sale-leaseback ("SL"). Each of these forms 
are explained in this chapter. The primary purpose of this 
research is to explore certain public policy implications of 
encouraging additional HEC vehicles for the elderly. 
Specifically examined are the economic consequences of 
extending the FHA Home Equity Conversion Mortgage program to 
allow for the following additional vehicles: (1) a growth
HECM, (2) an SI, and (3) a SL. Although other forms of HEC
6The "home equity conversion mortgage" is often referred 
to as a "reverse mortgage." The two terms will be used 
interchangeably in this study.
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are available to certain segments of the elderly or poor in 
some states, they are not part of this study due to their 
limited availability. Several states have also established 
HEC mechanisms for the poor or elderly that permit either 
deferral of property tax or maintenance costs (Scholen 1992, 
155-79). These are also not a part of this study.
This research is limited to HEC mechanisms that could be 
made available through financial institutions. Not considered 
are such items as intra-family HEC vehicles or changes in life 
style, e.g., renting a room or house sharing.*7
A rational decision model for pursuing any issue relating 
to a particular national policy would require (1) an 
examination of the reasons for the existing or proposed 
policy, (2) possible solutions to the issues raised by the 
policy, and (3) results of past alternatives implemented or 
tried. The purpose of this chapter is to provide such 
background on the issue of home equity conversion for the 
elderly consistent with this framework.
The chapter begins with a discussion of the economic 
theory of the lifetime consumption function, followed by a
7Pastalan (1983) observed that alternative living 
arrangements, such as leasing a room and building an accessory 
apartment would produce a larger increase in the homeowner's 
disposable income than a typical reverse mortgage. Pastalan 
fails to note that in many cases alternative living 
arrangements can be combined with a reverse mortgage (or other 
form of HEC) to further increase disposable income.
8
discussion of the need for home equity conversion. Next, some 
special policy issues of home equity conversion are mentioned.
The next three sections discuss the three major home 
equity conversion vehicles being examined in this research: 
(1) the home equity conversion mortgage, (2) the split 
interest, and (3) the sale-leaseback. Each section describes 
(Table 1 summarizes the significant attributes of the three 
plans);
• the vehicle,
• examples of programs using the vehicle, and 
policy issues, such as accounting, taxation, and 
other issues of special interest.
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TABLE 1
ATTRIBUTES OF HEC VEHICLES
ATTRIBUTE MORTGAGE
_ - . _ _ , .
SPLIT INTEREST SALE-LEASEBACK
HOME
GROWTH
RATE
The FHA absorbs x~i$k that
appreciation will be at least 
4 percent, any excess 
benefits the homeowner.
There is an interaction with 
life expectancy-
The FHA absorbs risk that 
appreciation will be at. least 4 
percent, .-any excess benefits the 
financial in.vt.i tut ion, There is 
an interaction with life 
expectancy.
The FHA absorbs risk that 
appreciation will be at least 4 
percent, any excess benefits the 
finaneia1 institution. There is 
no interaction with life 
expectancy.
INFLATION
RISK
Homeowner bears the full risk 
of inflation. A growth 
mortgage would provide 
in f 1 at ion protect.ion.
That portion of the inflation 
ri&k represe-n ting househoid 
operating costs are passed to 
the financial institution.
That portion of the inflation 
risk representing household 
operating costs? are passed to 
the financial institution.
UNEXPECTED
COSTS
Ko!r>ec%mer bears the risk of 
unexpected coets. This could 
cause foreclosure.
The financial institution bears 
the risk of unexpected costs.
The- financial institution bears 
the risk of unexpected costs.
INTEREST
RATE RISK
The financial institution 
bears the interest rate risk, 
h variable interest rate 
option allows the risk to be 
passed to the homeowner and 
the FHA-
The financial institution bears 
the interest rate risk.
The fInancial institution bears 
the interest rate risk.
INCOME TAX 
TREATMENT
Homeowner"» annuity payments
(are not taxed. On stove out 
gain i& taxable subject to 
$125,000 exclusion. On move- 
out or death interest is tax 
deductible.
The financial institution 
nr u s fc r ec o g n i z e sc c r u ed 
income, even though not. 
reccived.
Initial sale of remainder 
interest is subject to tax with 
no $125,000 e?iciuaion allowed, h 
portion o.t the annuity payments 
are taxable.
The f i n anc i a .1 ins titui i on ma y 
deduct its portion o£ the house 
operating expenses as well as 
its net annuity costs. Encoxne 
is recognised when the 
remainder interest is sold and 
when the annuitant dies (from 
expiration of annuity).
Initial sale of residence is 
subject to tax with §125,000 
exclusion allowed. A portion of 
the annait.y payments are 
taxable.
The financial institution 
receives rental .income and 
deducts home operating costs 
plus depreciation. The net 
annuity costs are deductible. 
Discharge of indebtedness income 
is recognized when the annuitant 
dies. The depreciation 
deduction provides some tax 
shelter,
The IRS has stated that it may 
treat a stale-leaseback, as a 
s p 1 i f i n t e r e a t c
ACCOUNTING
TREATMENT
Accounting is the same as 
tax. Income is reported 
despite negative cash flows,
Accounting is the same as tax. 
Costs are reported every year 
(annuity and house operating 
costs), but income is only 
reported when the house is sold 
and when the annuitant, dies.
Accounting is the same as tax 
except that depreciation uses a 
longer life. Income does not 
reflect guaranteed minimum sales 
price.
LIQUIDITY
Currently FNMA purchases all 
mortgages. The terms of the 
FHA mortgage makes it 
difficult to aecuritise.-
Some liquidity would be 
provided by transferring the 
annuity to an insurance company 
and selling the remainder 
interest to investors.
Some liquidity would be provided 
by transferring the annuity to 
an insurance company and selling 
the property to investors.
SSI
No SSI problems A portion of the annuity would 
probably be considered unearned 
income for purposes of SSI.
A  portion of the annuity would 
probably foe considered unearned 
.income for purposes of SSI.
MORTALITY
The risk of living beyond 
life expectancy is passed to 
the FHA*
The risk of living- beyond life 
expectancy is shared by the FHA 
and the financial institution. 
The financial institution 
profits if the homeowner does 
not survive to iife expectancy.
The risk, of living beyond life 
expectancy is shared by the FHA 
and the financial institution. 
The financial institution 
profits if the homeowner does 
not survive life expectancy (but 
leas so than the SI plan).
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2 * 1 Economic Basis for Home Equity Conversion
The socio-economic need for home equity conversion can be 
deduced from Modigliani and Brumberg1s (1954) life cycle 
hypothesis. The life cycle hypothesis ("LCH") states that 
individuals during their productive years will increase their 
wealth and during their non-productive years will deplete that 
wealth* As explained by Modigliani (1975), if one dismisses 
the bequest motive then all individuals have a lifetime 
marginal rate of consumption of one (i.e., consumption equals 
income) . During the working years, individuals allocate their 
income between consumption and savings based on the present 
value of future expected income, so that consumption can
remain constant for the person's entire lifetime. After
retirement, the individual depletes the wealth accumulated 
during working years with no appreciable change in
consumption.
Shortly after the formulation of the LCH, Friedman (1957) 
introduced the permanent income hypothesis ("PIH"). The PIH 
assumes that each household possesses an array of assets, 
human and non-human, from which it expects to receive a stream 
of returns. Returns from each asset are discounted by an 
appropriate discount rate; the rate for non-marketable assets 
may be extremely high (as high as 33.3 percent). The
discounted returns produce a value to each asset. Each 
asset's value is multiplied by its appropriate discount rate
11
to derive the permanent income from that asset. The sum of 
the permanent income from all assets is the household's 
permanent income. Friedman suggested that consumption is 
dependent on the household's permanent income.
Modigliani and Ando (1960) suggested that although the 
two hypotheses are different, they lead to many of the same 
results.8 For example, they noted that under both hypotheses 
the saving income ratio increases with income (p. 93)* They 
recognize that it is extremely difficult to test the two 
hypotheses, since both are based largely on unobservable 
variables. Consequently, many researchers test for a 
reduction in wealth during retirement.
The LCH assumes that wealth will be depleted during 
retirement, while the PIH assumes wealth will remain constant. 
Research findings have not been conclusive. One problem is 
that facts can often be interpreted differently. Disparate 
interpretations may support conflicting conclusions. For 
example Mirer (1979) and Dicks-Mireaux and King (1984) argued 
that when the actuarial value of Social Security and other 
annuity income is included in the calculation of wealth, there 
is clear evidence that wealth does decline during retirement. 
In contrast, Bernheim (1987) argued that in testing the 
hypotheses, the capitalized value of the current return from
8Modigliani (1975) reinforced these views and noted that 
assuming expected lifetimes were infinite, PIH and LCH lead to 
about the same results.
12
annuities should be used.9 It may be inappropriate to use 
annuities to compare the two hypotheses. Under the PIH, the 
entire annuity would likely be considered permanent income 
although it is a depleting asset*
Based on the LCH, one would conclude that home ownership 
would increase with age and then decrease after retirement. 
As indicated by two studies, the evidence is mixed. Li (1977) 
used logit analysis to find the factors that influence home 
ownership in Boston and Baltimore. The variables examined 
were income, age of head of household, family size, and race. 
Li found a life cycle effect. As a family gets older and 
larger during the early years of marriage, the probability of 
home ownership increases, as family size gets smaller from 
ages 45-64, the probability decreases. The probability 
decreases further for two-person households over age 65. 
While consistent with a life cycle effect on savings and 
overall consumption, these studies are not conclusive. The 
results may be confounded by a life cycle effect of housing 
needs.
Chen and Jensen (1985) used a logit model to estimate the 
likelihood of "using" home equity by employing various
9He argues that if annuities yielded more than the 
appropriate interest rate, then a person would put all of 
their assets in annuities. However, This argument does not 
appear to persuasive. Insurance companies sell their annuity 
products on the basis of achieving a higher current return 
than could be earned by investing in bonds.
13
measures of demographic characteristics, as well as income, 
and wealth. Of the 1,706 households studied, 77 or 4.5 
percent used their home equity. Using home equity included
(1) taking out a second mortgage, (2) adding a home addition 
or repair into an existing mortgage, or (3) using home equity 
as security for a consumer loan. Mortgage refinancing would 
have been included had there been any cases in the data set. 
They found that elderly had a low likelihood of using equity 
regardless of marital status, retirement status, or income 
level. They concluded that older homeowners do not rely on 
dissavings to fund current consumption. The authors noted 
that there are two important limitations to their research due 
to the lack of available data: (1) the inability to include
sale of the home as a use and (2) the inability to find 
whether a use was voluntary or involuntary. An interesting 
finding in the study is that even given the same wealth, 
higher income persons are more likely to borrow than middle 
income persons. Low income persons are most likely to 
borrow. The authors theorize that this may be due to higher 
income individuals being more likely to take on risk (p. 51) 
or that financing is more available to upper income 
individuals (p. 55) . Artie and Variya (1978) using a
theoretical model hypothesized that consumer durables have a 
constraining effect on consumption allocation. The restricted 
ability to borrow against equity in the home leads to
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discontinuities in the life cycle consumption profile. This 
hypothesis is inconsistent with the findings of Chen and 
Jensen (1985). Chen and Jensen concluded that the liquid to 
total asset ratio is not a significant predictor in their 
model.
From the aforementioned discussion, one might infer that 
for home equity conversion to be effective, the LCH must be 
correct. After all, if the elderly do not decrease wealth 
over time, they do not need home equity conversion. However, 
under Friedman's PIH, home equity conversion would be useful. 
If home equity were to be converted into a life annuity, the 
stream of income from the annuity would be included in the 
homeowner's permanent income, thereby, increasing the 
homeowner's consumption. In short, home equity conversion 
would increase consumption under either theory.
2•2 Need for Home Equity Conversion
Underlying home equity conversion is the premise that the 
home is a major source of wealth of many, if not most, elderly 
Americans. Home equity represents over 40 percent of the net 
worth of the elderly (U.S. Senate Committee on the Aging et 
al. 1991, 75). Home equity conversion provides a mechanism 
for the elderly to consume their home equity during retirement 
without having to give up their home. Much of the research 
on the need for home equity conversion is based on demographic 
data. For example, Springer (1985) also pointed out that home
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equity represented 42 percent of the elderly*s net worth in 
1975. He also noted that a 1979 survey showed that over 70 
percent of the elderly owned their own homes and of the 70 
percent, over 80 percent owned their homes without a mortgage. 
Some, primarily the unmarried, have no home equity at all. 
But, for those that do, home equity conversion could increase 
household income up to 40 percent (those with the lowest 
incomes).
Similarly, Howard (1987) analyzed the raw data on 351 
homeowners in. Columbus, Ohio, selected from the public-use 
data tape of the 1982 Annual Housing Survey. Subjects 
selected were all over 65 and owned a home. She examined 
three possible plans: deferred loans for home repairs, SI and
SL. Thirty-one percent of the single homeowners and 10 
percent of the married homeowners lived below the poverty line 
and older persons had lower incomes than younger persons 
(showing a LCH effect) . There was a significant, but not 
extremely large correlation between home equity and income 
(r=.52), suggesting that a substantial number of the elderly 
poor live in homes with substantial value. She found that 25 
percent of the sampled population indicated an interest in a 
HEC plan. She concluded that due to the diversity of the 
needs of the elderly, none of the plans can be assumed to be 
superior to the others.
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Gasper (1984) simulated the addition of a ten-year term 
reverse mortgage10 on data received from the Social Security 
Administration's Longitudinal Retirement History Study which 
began in 1969. Annuity payments would have resulted in an 11 
to 18 percent increase in median real cash flow and between 25 
and 35 percent of the individuals in poverty would have moved 
above the poverty line due to the payments. Median net worth 
would have increased 33 percent over the decade, while only 12 
percent of the individuals would have reduced their net worth.
Speare (1992) used data from the 1984 Panel of the Survey 
of Income and Program Participation developed by the Bureau of 
Census. He adjusted the data to assume that elderly 
homeowners would have received a 9 percent FHA home equity 
conversion mortgage (with $1,500 of closing costs and $25 per 
month service fee). Speare found that the percentage of 
households increasing their household income (after adjustment 
for existing mortgage payments) increased from 6.9 percent of 
those between 65 and 69 to 66.8 percent of those aged 85 and 
over. Also, 22 percent of the households with household 
income below the poverty threshold would now be above the 
threshold with the home equity conversion mortgage* This is 
much lower than Gasper (1984), but still significant.
10Annuity payments were computed to result in a mortgage 
balance of eighty percent of the current value of the home at 
the end of the ten-year period. This mortgage is far less 
attractive to the homeowner than the FHA plan*
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Jacobs (1987) found that the homeowner's additional 
annuity obtained from home equity conversion would be an 
effective way to finance long term care for the elderly* 
Jacobs assumed that the money obtained from the annuity would 
be used for long term care. Two econometric studies suggest 
that Jacob's assumption may not be valid. Katsura et al. 
(1989) combining simulation with a proprietary econometric 
model examined the impact on the quality of housing of four 
alternative policies: (1) expanded housing vouchers for low-
income elderly renters, (2) housing vouchers for elderly 
homeowners, (3) expanded availability of HECMs, and (4) 
congregate housing vouchers for low-income impaired elderly. 
They concluded that expanded HECMs would not significantly 
improve the quality of housing, because most of the cash 
received would be used for living expenses and not re-invested 
in housing. Rivlin et al. (1988) explored various
alternatives for financing long-term (i.e., nursing home) care 
for the elderly. A HECM was added to a proprietary 
econometric model. They wanted to know if the availability of 
the HECM would appreciably affect the purchase of long term 
care insurance. They found that the percentage of the elderly 
purchasing long term care insurance would not increase 
significantly unless the proceeds of the annuity were 
specifically designated for the insurance.
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Although there may be a need for home equity conversion, 
the research does not indicate that there is a large demand. 
Chen (1973) surveyed a stratified sample of 455 homeowners 
aged 55 to 75 in Los Angeles County. He found that only 9 
percent of those interviewed would be interested in a HEC 
program similar to an SI in which the homeowner would be 
responsible for all expenses. There may be several reasons 
for this apparent lack of interest. Among them could be (1) 
emotional ties to the homestead, (2) poor information or 
understanding of the plan, and (3) a perception that Chen's 
proposal made poor economic sense. Seventeen percent 
indicated that they would not live long enough to get money 
out of the plan and 16 percent indicated that there was not 
enough income. Weinrobe (1987) analyzed the data using a 
probit model and found that older and poorer persons were more 
likely to convert and single persons were more likely to 
convert than married persons. Elderly who rely on a child as 
a principal advisor were unlikely to convert*
More recent studies have shown an increase in homeowner 
interest in these plans. About four years later, a study in 
Ithaca, New York, modeled on Chen's work, found that 31 
percent of homeowners over age 65 were interested in home 
equity conversion (Nelson 1980, 15) . Nelson suggests that two 
reasons may account for the difference in results: the Ithaca
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survey was limited to those over age 65 and there was rapid 
inflation during the intervening period.
A survey of 549 Wisconsin homeowners aged 65 and over 
indicated that 44 percent were "interested" or "very 
interested" in one or more of the following HEC plans: 
reverse mortgage [term mortgage], reverse annuity mortgage 
[tenure mortgage], SL, and tax postponement (Nelson 1980). 
The SL model was the most popular with over 27 percent 
interest? 26 percent had an interest in tax postponement; and 
16 percent showed interest in each of the mortgage plans. 
Nelson noted that those with the greatest need for home equity 
conversion (widows over 75 living alone with income of less 
than $5,000) were the least likely to be interested. He 
surmised that this might be due to lack of understanding of 
the plans. Kummerow (1980), using the same data, found that 
interest in HEC plans, and in particular the tax postponement 
plan, increases with income and education. This may be 
similar to the effect found in Chen and Jensen (1985) and 
suggests that upper income homeowners may be interested in 
home equity conversion as an additional vehicle in personal 
financial planning.
Venti and Wise (1990) developed a simultaneous 
equations model for estimating the desire to change principal 
residences. An assumption of the model is that a household 
evaluates its optimal housing needs against its current
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housing each period, based on its current circumstances. The 
family moves if the household receives an economic benefit 
from moving, above the transaction costs (which includes 
parameters for family status) * Venti and Wise ("V & W") then 
applied the model to 3,423 families in the Social Security 
Retirement History Survey, which covered the years 1969 to 
1979 in bi-annual increments. They found that only 7.5 
percent of the retired homeowners tended to move during a two- 
year period, with 15 percent moving during periods of shocks 
(such as change in marital status or retirement). Contrary to 
the life cycle hypothesis, V & W concluded that there is no 
evidence that the elderly wish to reduce their housing equity; 
rather, there is a tendency to want to increase housing 
equity. Although some families, particularly those with low 
income and high housing equity, reduce their equity, this is 
more than offset by other elderly that increase their equity. 
V & W further noted that transaction costs may prevent some 
families from reducing home equity. This could be corrected 
by home equity conversion, but they questioned whether the 
demand was sufficient to support an active market. There are 
two significant biases in their research. First, they exclude 
families that moved to a rental unit on their first move from 
the sample. Considering the low probability of moving, the 
elimination of those that clearly reduced their housing equity 
is a significant bias. In addition, the results may be biased
21
due to the inflation in housing values during the period 
combined with a poor stock market* Changes in housing wealth 
may be due more to fluctuating prices than increasing housing 
stock. V & W (1991) further explored the viability of 
reverse mortgages. First, they replicated the 1990 experiment 
using the 1984 Survey of Income and Program Participation, 
provided by the Bureau of the Census and found consistent 
results. As additional evidence they show that housing wealth 
among homeowners is relatively constant with age (with a very 
small downward drift). They also found that the correlation 
between liquid wealth and housing wealth was almost zero, 
suggesting no substitution effect. From this they conclude 
that the elderly would not want reverse mortgages, even if 
they could get them. They concluded that the amount of a 
reverse mortgage annuity is not large enough to be significant 
to the average elderly homeowner. Speare (1992) pointed out 
that this conclusion assumes a much lower interest rate than 
is normally used to discount the value of the house. Speare 
suggested that although the lower rate is appropriate for 
commercial annuities, it may not be appropriate for reverse 
annuity mortgages. Speare also noted that the conclusion is 
biased, since V & W include persons aged 55 to 64 in some of 
their calculations. Higgins and Folts (1992) computed the 
annuity payable using various reverse mortgage plans and 
concluded that, except for the extremely elderly, the equity
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of most "house rich cash poor" elderly would not support large
annuity payments. However, they note:
The real value of a small increase in monthly 
disposable income is a matter of perspective. For 
someone who lives at the margin of economic 
independence, an additional several dollars each 
month may represent much, indeed, (p. 199).
V & W (1991) acknowledge that the vast majority of the
elderly1s wealth is in Social Security (89 percent receive
benefits) and private pensions (59 percent receive benefits).
The decline in the value of the benefits with age, and
therefore the total wealth of the elderly, is consistent with
the life cycle hypothesis. The importance of pension benefits
may also suggest that although the elderly may not want
additional income, they may be interested in the inflation
protection of the SL and SI plans.
The conclusions of Venti and Wise (1990, 1991) are not
surprising. Convenient forms of HEC for the elderly are not
generally available. The standard home mortgage and the home
equity loan generally have the following characteristics that
make them inappropriate to use as a HEC device:
(1) They do not provide for life tenancy. If payments
are not made when due, foreclosure can force the
homeowner from the home.
(2) They require the homeowner to establish that the
loan can be repaid from future income (and not out
of the equity in the home).
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The essence of home equity conversion is that the elderly 
homeowner generally will not take any action that will affect 
life tenure in the home. In addition, the homeowner does not 
have the income to repay the loan and must rely on the equity 
in the home itself for repayment. The use of prior data may 
be inappropriate. Since home equity conversion was
unavailable, the data may be biased by home equity 
conversion's omission from the database. The reason for 
homeowners failure to reduce home equity may be due to 
unavailability of an acceptable vehicle for doing so.
2.3 Policy Issues
To a large extent, the success of home equity conversion 
may depend more on certain policy issues than on whether it is 
a viable product. For example, if the income tax rules are 
uncertain, then financial institutions would be reluctant to 
offer products and homeowners may be unwilling to consider 
that which is offered.
The policy issues discussed are:
Accounting issues;
Income tax issues?
Social welfare issues;
Liquidity issues? and 
Profitability issues.
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2.3.1 Accounting Issues
Accounting policy issues center on two areas. First is 
clarity of the accounting treatment. If the accounting
treatment of a HEC vehicle is either uncertain or cumbersome, 
financial institutions may resist offering that vehicle. The 
second issue is whether the accounting treatment for a vehicle 
reflects its ability to generate future cash flows. If the 
accounting treatment differs from the expected cash flows, not 
only will this conflict with the precepts of FASB Statement of 
Accounting Concepts No. 1 (Para. 25) , but may discourage
financial institutions from offering the vehicle. It has been 
shown that regulated financial institutions will sacrifice 
cash flow so as to maintain regulatory income. (Scholes, 
Wilson, and Wolfson 1989) .
An example of the effects of uncertain and unfavorable 
accounting rules is Providential Corporation, the first 
publicly held company formed for the purpose of issuing 
conventional (non-insured) reverse mortgages. It issued its 
prospectus on February 10, 1992. There was no problem with 
the company's accounting treatment of its reverse mortgage
portfolio. In a letter dated July 14, 1992, the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC11) notified the company that it 
must change it method of accounting for reverse mortgages. 
The SEC advised that in accruing income from reverse 
mortgages, the company was permitted to incorporate actual
25
increases in underlying property values, but was required to 
incorporate decreases in projected property values. Projected 
increases in property values were precluded. After the 
announcement, Providential stock dropped from around 11 to 6 
1/2, although it had actual cash of $11 per share.11 After 
negotiations, the company agreed that the new rules would be 
effective for loans issued after January 1, 1992. For prior 
loans, interest could continue to accrue until the loan 
balance exceeds 70 percent of the home's fair market value 
(Providential 1992b).
Due to pressure from the American Association of Retired 
Persons (AARP), the SEC changed its mind, issuing a memorandum 
outlining its new position (Harney 1992). The nine point 
memorandum, which applies to uninsured reverse mortgages, 
permits the use of projected property values in computing 
income (SEC 1992). It requires an annual calculation of the 
actual and expected return from each mortgage pool using 
appropriate statistical techniques (Monte Carlo simulation is 
specifically mentioned) for projected future cash flows. If 
the expected return from a pool is either higher or lower than 
the previous year, the income from the pool is adjusted 
appropriately. For example, assume a mortgage pool was 
projected to return 9 percent at the end of 1992. After
11Greenberg, Herb. "Reverse Mortgages Hit by SEC," The 
San Francisco Chronicle. 29 July 1992, B1.
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including actual 1993 cash flow and revising assumptions on 
projected home values and based on actual life expectancy, the 
return is expected to be 10 percent. The financial 
institution would report income from reverse mortgages in 1993 
as the total amount that would have accrued since the 
beginning of the mortgage using a rate of 10 percent less the 
total amounts accrued in 1992 and prior years.
The memorandum also provides seven disclosures that are 
required in the footnotes of the financial statement. These 
include, for example, the accounting policy used, statistical 
methods, and nature and source of significant assumptions. It 
also requires a sensitivity analysis showing the impact on the 
effective yield, net income and retained earnings assuming 
property values do not change or that property values increase 
at one percentage point less than projections.
According to the President's letter in Providential1s 
1992 annual report, the new rules did not significantly affect 
Providential1s earnings. Providential stock closed at 8 3/4 
at the end of 1992. Providential claims that potential 
lenders are weary about extending financing, fearing that the 
SEC might change its mind.12 The SEC rulings may have hurt 
others in the industry as well. American Homestead Inc. had 
been the first reverse mortgage lender in 1983, but had been
12"Reverse Mortgage Lender Still Has Trouble," National 
Mortgage News, 3 May 1993, p. 5.
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inactive for a few years. An initial public offering was 
registered with the SEC in May 1992.13 A year later, the 
stock has not been issued. Capital Holding, a large insurance 
company, abandoned its reverse mortgage program after five 
years. One reason given was that the new accounting rules 
diminish the profitability of the mortgages (Manning 1993). 
2*3.2 Income Tax Issues
There are four basic tax policy issues that relate to 
this research. These are: (1) ambiguous law, (2) horizontal
equity, (3) vertical equity, and (4) tax subsidy. If the tax 
law relating to a HEC vehicle is ambiguous, then both 
homeowners and financial institutions will avoid the vehicle 
or seek a higher return in exchange for the higher risk. The 
tax treatment by the homeowner or the financial institution 
may be ambiguous because of lack of guidance from the tax 
authorities or because of an adverse, but challengeable, 
position taken by the tax authorities. An adverse position by 
the tax authorities may also raise the question of horizontal 
equity* Horizontal equity seeks to tax similar transactions 
in a similar way. Vertical equity seeks to impose tax based 
on ability to pay; persons with a greater ability to pay 
should pay a higher tax. If the government provides a tax
13W. , Michael, "Company Known for Reverse Mortgages Sets 
IPO," Philadelphia Business Journal, sec. 1 p. 13.
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incentive for a particular transaction, it is known as a tax 
subsidy. Tax subsidies are often called tax expenditures.
Issues of ambiguous law and horizontal equity are 
addressed along with each plan discussed in this chapter. Tax 
equity and tax subsidy are tested and are discussed in the 
next two chapters. It is not possible to test horizontal 
equity statistically, because each vehicle has different risk 
characteristics.
2.3.3 Social Welfare Issues
The median household income of FHA HECM mortgagor is only 
$7,572 and their median Social Security income is $7,005 (HUD 
1992) . Thus, it is likely that many of the homeowners using 
home equity conversion are eligible for public assistance. 
The form of HEC affects the supplemental security income (SSI) 
and other public assistance. SSI has an asset test and an 
income test. None of the HEC plans affects the asset test; 
the value of the home and other assets that are not controlled 
by the recipient (e.g., annuities) are excluded from the test. 
However, income received from the annuities from SLs and Sis 
could be considered income for purposes of the income test, 
and therefore possibly reduce SSI assistance [Scholen 1991, 
45, citing 20 CFR Sec. 416.1121(c)]. There is evidence that 
the Social Security Administration may be flexible on this 
point. The Social Security Administration issued a favorable 
determination that annuity payments from an SI plan sponsored
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by Arkansas would not be included in income for purposes of 
eligibility for SSI (ABA 1986). Since the HECM is a loan, it 
is not included in the income test. Note, however, that if 
part of the annuity received by the homeowner under any of the 
three plans is not expended, then the cash received and the 
income thereon is included in the asset and income tests. 
Although state assistance laws often follow federal standard, 
some state assistance programs might have different qualifying 
tests.
2*3.4 Liquidity Issues
There is anecdotal evidence suggesting that one obstacle 
to increased availability of home equity conversions is the 
lack of liquidity to the financial institution. As of August 
1992, the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) 
purchased about 94 percent of the FHA HECM mortgages issued 
(HUD 1992, p. 3-14). The remaining 6 percent are either in 
process or are loans that FNMA would not accept. HUD (pp. 3- 
14 to 15) recognizes the importance of the secondary market in 
developing the product (implying that FNMA has essentially 
dictated the market terms). HUD also notes the importance of 
securitization. It further notes that FNMA does not believe 
that the FHA mortgage can be securitized* Therefore, HUD 
concludes that due to the annuity-like structure of reverse 
mortgages, insurance companies are likely to be the only 
investors comfortable with the variable payment stream.
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2.3.5 Profitability Issues
The FHA HEC project is designed to break-even (HUD 1990,
p. 3-10)* If the project is unprofitable, the cost will be
borne by the taxpayer. In addition, government programs
normally should be employed to supplement and not compete with
the private sector. An unprofitable FHA program may
discourage private companies from entering into the home
equity conversion market.
The FHA program has been criticized for being too liberal
in its assumptions (see, e.g., Speare (1992). Phillips (1991,
37) , an executive of Capital Holding Corporation, a private
HECM lender (at that time), had the following comments:
[B]eing in the reverse mortgage business is sort of 
like being in the jungle with an 800 pound gorilla.
As long as the gorilla is going ' the way you want 
him to, it's helpful to follow along through a 
cleared path. But if the gorilla decides to turn 
on us, we're dead. . . . FHA is largely confining 
its activities to the neediest homeowners whose 
home values are too small to make a private program 
worthwhile, at least for now. . . .  So far, 
segmentation has limited most of our cost and 
design concerns about the FHA program to a question 
of how much it will ultimately cost us as 
taxpayers.
Szymanoski (1992), who developed the FHA plan, admits 
that some FHA assumptions may be too liberal and cites two 
reasons for this. First, liberal assumptions are
counterbalanced by conservative assumptions* For example, not 
all homeowners will use the maximum benefits allowed under the 
plan, either by election or by owning a home with a value of
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over the FHA limits. Second, whereas the forward FHA program 
provides for a refund to qualifying homeowners of excess 
premiums collected, this does not exist for the HECM program. 
Such a policy imposes a greater duty to avoid overcharging 
premiums, particularly where the borrowers are poor and 
elderly.
Expanding on this duty, Szymanoski (1993b) appears to
make the argument that the FHA1s market is the elderly poor
and that the private market should limit itself to the upper
and middle classes:
I smile when 1 recall Bill [Phillips'] metaphor of 
the 800 pound gorilla. Bill's comments I think 
were made in the context of a business "competitor18 
who did not really appreciate the market 
segmentation between his product and the FHA 
program. He is not the only person to have pointed 
out some of FHA1 s generous assumptions . . . , but
he clearly has not recognized that FHA1s market is 
much lower in income than Capital Holding's market.
I've always felt that this market segmentation 
justifies FHA's use of more liberal underwriting 
assumptions, particularly with regard to mortality 
assumptions.
Even if it is assumed that liberal assumptions are permitted, 
it is important to know what the effects of the assumptions 
are to the profitability of the entire model. The overview of 
the assumptions of the FHA model later in this chapter will 
include the specific criticisms of the model.
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2 .4 Home Ecniitv Conversion Mortgages
The home equity conversion mortgage ("HECM") is the most 
common form of home equity conversion. The HECM is often 
called a reverse mortgage because it is the opposite of a 
normal (forward) mortgage. In a forward home mortgage, the 
borrower receives a lump-sum payment equal to the value of the 
loan (a percentage of the home's value) in exchange for a 
contractual set of payments to be made in the future. By 
combining two formulas,14 The amount of each periodic 
payment for a standard self-amortizing mortgage is:
14The computation is based on the standard formula for 
the present value of an annuity of $1 per period (Reilly 1985, 
871) :
1 -  1---
PYAn  =  --------------t~~k) ”
and the formula for the periodic payment is
PVA$i
Where
A is the required periodic payment;
PV$i is the present value of $1 per period; 
n is the number of periodic payments required;
k is the periodic interest rate; and
P is the amount borrowed.
The computation of the formulas for determining the maximum
line of credit and the periodic payment for a term mortgage
are combined in a similar manner. The underlying components 
of these mortgages will not be separately stated.
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A = -----------------   ( 1)
1 -  ± -
(1 + k)a
Where
A is the amount of the periodic payment;
P is the amount borrowed;
n is the number of periodic payments to be made; and
k is the interest rate per period.
The repayments include interest on the outstanding loan 
balance and the repayment of the principal for the mortgage 
term. Over time, the loan balance is reduced and at the end 
of the mortgage term, the loan is paid off. In the HECM, the 
borrower receives no lump-sum payment at the inception of the 
loan. Instead, the borrower receives money periodically from 
the lender, and the outstanding loan balance increases over 
time due to the periodic payments and the accrual of interest. 
The loan is paid-off in a lump-sum when the borrower either
moves or dies, or at a contracted future term date.
There are three types of HECMs, namely line of credit,
term, and tenure. A line of credit home equity conversion
mortgage is similar to a standard home-equity loan. The
principal difference is that the line of credit HECM by its
terms need not be repaid until the borrower vacates the home 
or dies. In addition, a line of credit HECM is likely to be 
without recourse. The general formula for the amount of a 
line of credit HECM is
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P = — £   (2)
(l+k)n
Where
P is maximum allowed line of credit;
k is the interest rate per period;
n is the number of periods before the loan is due;
and
F is the amount due at the end of n periods.
A home equity conversion term mortgage, makes periodic
payments to the borrower up to a fixed due date, or the date
the borrower vacates or dies (if earlier). If the borrower 
remains in the home at the due date, most HEC term mortgages 
require that the mortgage balance be repaid; however, the FHA 
HEC term mortgage does not require repayment until the 
borrower vacates or dies. The formula for determining the 
periodic payments of a standard home equity conversion term 
mortgage (which must be repaid on a fixed date) is
A = --- — --- (3)(1+Jc) - 1
Where
A is the periodic annuity payment?
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k is the periodic interest rate?
n is the number of periods the annuity is paid; and
F is the mortgage balance at the end of period n.
The tenure mortgage, pays (actually lends) the borrower 
a fixed annuity for life or until the house is vacated? it 
does not matter if the mortgage principal increases above the 
value of the home* At the end of the mortgage term, the house 
is sold and the mortgage is repaid. The monthly payment for 
a tenure mortgage is computed in the same way as a term 
mortgage, except that the mortgagee uses a formula to 
determine n (the expected number of periods the annuity is to 
be paid). Since tenure mortgages are generally without 
recourse, if the value of the home at the end of the mortgage 
term is less than the mortgage principal, the property is 
handed over to the lender.
The risks to a lender are different for a tenure mortgage 
than for a normal forward mortgage. Since the borrower makes 
no mortgage payments, default risk is limited to the 
borrower's inability to pay for property taxes, insurance, or 
maintenance costs of the home. The major risk is that the 
borrower will outlive his/her life expectancy, which is 
diversifiable, or that the home value at term will be less
than projected at mortgage origination, which is partially
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diversifiable15. In a forward mortgage the borrower is not 
concerned with the financial stability of the lender, at most, 
the lender can misappropriate the borrower's escrow account. 
In a HECM mortgage, the borrower is concerned that the lender 
won't meet its contracted future annuity payments. One 
advantage of an insured HECM mortgage over a conventional 
mortgage is that the insurance protects both the financial 
institution and the borrower.
The remainder of this discussion is divided into the 
following sections:
Conventional HECM products?
The FHA HECM?
Accounting for the insured HECM; and 
Taxation of the HECM.
2-4.1 Conventional HECM Products
It should be noted at the outset that detailed 
information on conventional mortgage products is often not 
available. Some programs no longer exist and most of those 
that do exist often only provide the minimum amount of
15The risk that an individual property increases in value 
at a rate lower than the increase for property values in 
general is largely diversifiable. That portion of the risk 
that represents a skewness in expected returns in relation to 
the variance in property value increases is not diversif iable. 
In addition, the risk that overall property values do not 
increase at the rate expected is a non-diversifiable market 
risk.
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disclosure required by law. Details of specific assumptions 
and methods are considered proprietary.
The earliest reverse mortgage programs often looked much 
like their forward mortgage counterparts. A prominent example 
of this type of program was the Reverse Annuity Mortgage 
("RAM") Program of the San Francisco Development Fund. The 
RAM program was structured so that the agency acted as a 
broker between the elderly homeowner and the provider of 
funds. The total number of loans originated under the plan 
was 234 (Weinrobe 1988). These were fixed rate mortgages with 
a maximum maturity of 12 years (but 10 years was the longest 
term generally suggested). Loans were due at maturity even if 
the homeowner were still living in the house. The maximum 
final loan balance was limited to the smaller of 80 percent of 
the initial property value or $150,000. Loans with a final 
balance of less than $50,000 were not accepted. Loans 
generally provided for level monthly payments for the period 
of the loan, although a graduated payment schedule (in which 
payments increased by 6 percent per year) was also available 
(Weinrobe 1987).
Assuming the home is an investment, Tate (1987) examined 
HECMs from the homeowner's perspective. An underlying 
assumption was that the home is leased to a third party at 
fair market value) . First, he found that the internal rate of 
return ("IRR") of a typical home in Orlando, Florida is 8.92
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percent plus the inflation rate, yielding an expected return 
of 13.12 percent with a standard deviation of about 1 percent 
(after transaction costs) . He then added a HECM with a 10 
percent interest rate* In general, he found, as would be 
expected, that if the IRR on the property is higher than 10 
percent, the HECM results in a higher rate of return on the 
investment. Surprisingly, the addition of the HECM did not 
materially affect the expected return its standard deviation. 
Finally, he concluded that the risk adjusted rate of return on 
home ownership was favorable when compared to alternative 
investments (the risk free investment and the S & P 500 
index). His study suggests that from an investment 
standpoint, using home equity for additional income is 
preferable to disposing of the equity and using the proceeds 
to rent.
The typical term reverse mortgage had drawbacks to both 
the homeowner and the financial institution. If the homeowner 
lived beyond the term of the loan the homeowner could be 
forced out of the house by foreclosure. Due to the 
conservative terms of the mortgages, the financial institution 
had little default risk on the mortgages (see Weinrobe 1988). 
However, it was placed in the unenviable position of being the 
"Scrooge1 that evicts an elderly widow from her home (see 
Archer and Nye 1987). Two economic studies of home equity 
conversion investigated the insurance premium needed to insure
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a term HECM. Weinrobe (1988) noted that the Florida Home 
Equity Conversion Act, Sections 697.202 - 697.206 Florida
Statutes (1986) authorized an insurance program to guarantee 
lenders against default for a term HECM with requirements 
similar to that in the RAM program.16 As noted by Weinrobe 
(p. 647), this would only insure against depreciating home
values. Using simulation, he explored the economics to the 
insurer of three possible insured plans: (1) a ten-year term 
HECM with the full amount due at the end of the term (similar 
to the Florida program) ? (2) a term HECM with ten years of
annuity payment and deferred repayment when tenure is 
completed; and (3) a tenure mortgage. In addition, he 
investigated a modified second plan in which the insurer is 
assumed to purchase the mortgage at the end of the term 
instead of providing insurance. In each of the four cases, an 
annuity payment would be provided that results in a mortgage 
balance equal to 80 percent of the current home value at the 
end of the term (or the homeowner's life expectancy with a 
tenure mortgage). He examined the required premium for these 
models for a 75 year old woman assuming various rates of 
increase in the value of the home. For example, he found that 
a tenure mortgage would require an up-front insurance charge
16The insurance program was never implemented (July 10, 
1993 telephone interview with Mary Ann Hoffman, Community 
Assistance Consultant, Florida Housing Finance Agency).
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of 5.8 percent of the home value, or an annual fee of 0.6 
percent of the disbursements paid.
Archer and Nye (1987) developed a model for pricing the 
insurance for an unusual HECM? the model assumes the lender is 
the insurer* They assumed that a lump-sum HECM, in which a 
lump-sum is provided which would result in a terminal value 
equal to the expected value of the home when tenure is deemed 
to end and would produce an insurance premium of zero. Like 
Weinrobe (1988), they used simulation, varying the assumptions 
of their model. They noted that the maximum net benefit 
(i.e., the lump-sum payment) is sensitive to changes in 
assumptions, particularly for younger homeowners* For 
example, they found that a one percentage point increase in 
pre-death terminations would increase the maximum net benefit 
by over 10 percent for homeowners under age seventy. Also, by 
using an annuity table to find life expectancy instead of life 
tables would reduce payments by 22 percent for ages 60-69 and 
13 percent for ages over 90.
American Homestead, Inc. was one of the first to offer a 
HECM that guaranteed payments for life. American Homestead 
began research on HECMs in 1981 (when the RAM program began). 
In late 1983 American Homestead introduced its reverse shared 
appreciation mortgage (RSAM), which it called The Century
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Plan™ (Leban 1984).17 Garnett and Guttentag (1984) 
developed a simulation model to evaluate a RSAM based on 
American Homestead's parameters. Clearly the model, which was 
essentially a capital budgeting model, was used to develop 
American Homestead's plan. The main features of Homestead's 
RSAM were that it guaranteed life tenure in the home and life 
time payments (unless the homeowner sold the home) . To 
provide a reasonable income to the homeowner, the lender 
participated in the appreciation of the house (a 50 and 100 
percent options were available). Life expectancy was 
determined using sex based 1971 Annuity Tables. An 
undisclosed factor for move-outs was used, but the probability 
for move-out was reduced as the amount of the homeowner's 
equity was reduced. American Homestead no longer offers a 
reverse mortgage product. As discussed in Section 2.3.1, 
American Homestead registered an initial public offering with 
the SEC in early 1992, presumably to begin offering more 
reverse mortgages, but the stock was never issued.
In 1985, Capital Holding Corporation, a large insurance 
company, instituted its HECM, which it called the Home Income 
Security Plan. The plan provided a tenure home equity 
conversion mortgage (i.e. , the payments continued and the loan 
was not repaid until the homeowner dies, sells the house, or
17Leban, Vice President and Corporate Counsel of American 
Homestead Mortgage Corporation, also summarizes the problems, 
including legal problems, in developing the product.
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permanently moves away). The plan charged an up front "fixed 
premium" of 7 percent of the home value to pay for risk 
pooling. In addition it charged a $100 application fee and 
$3,000 in closing costs. If cash advances did not exceed the 
premium plus closing costs at the end of the mortgage, the 
excess was refunded. Interest accrued at 2.5 percentage 
points over the ten-year U.S. Treasury securities rate and was 
adjusted annually. At the end of the loan, the amount that 
must be repaid was the least of the following three amounts:
(1) the loan balance? (2) 93 percent of the fair market value 
of the house when the loan is repaid? or (3) the initial value 
of the house at the time the loan was made increased by a rate 
equal to the increase in the Consumer Price Index plus 1.3 
percent. The company allowed a homeowner to mortgage only a 
certain portion of the property* For example, a homeowner may 
set aside 25 percent of the value of the home. All mortgage 
calculations would be made on 75 percent of the value. When 
the home is sold, again all mortgage calculations would be 
based on a 75 percent interest in the home; twenty-five 
percent of the sale proceeds would go to the homeowner or the 
homeowner's beneficiaries (Scholen 1991? 1992, 250-260)* As 
stated in Section 2.3.1, in April 1993, Capital Holding 
decided to cease its HECM product. It cited as reasons (1) 
the lack of consumer interest, (2) an expected lower increase 
in home values, and (3) unfavorable accounting rules,
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particularly relating to the 7 percent "fixed premium" 
(Manning 1993).
Providential Corporation markets a tenure reverse 
mortgage, primarily in California. It introduced its first 
tenure mortgage in 1988. The mortgage was similar to that 
offered by American Homestead (Klein and Simians 1993, 34). 
The mortgage contains a set aside feature similar to Capital 
Holding's. Unlike Capital Holding, the mortgage is a fixed 
rate mortgage that generally has a higher rate than typical 
forward mortgages. In addition, mortgages issued before 1991 
contained a shared appreciation provision, which Providential 
calls a "Premium.11 Providential suspended funding of its 
reverse mortgage in October 1990 due to lack of funding. 
During the three-year period it made 748 loans (out of 30,000 
inquiries). As stated in Section 2.3.2, Providential made an 
initial public offering in early 1992 to provide funding for 
additional loans. According to its prospectus (Providential 
1992), it expects that new loans will be similar to the pre- 
1991 loans, except that the Premium will be a fixed charge 
payable over the term of the mortgage instead of a percentage 
of the appreciation in the property.
In March 1993, Transamerica announced that it was 
entering the reverse mortgage market with the Home Income 
Plan. This plan is interesting because it was specifically 
designed to be securitized. The mortgage generally requires
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an initial home value of at least $125,000, which is generally 
above the FHA limit. The mortgage is divided into three 
parts: (1) a lump-sum payment, (2) a reserve account, and (3)
a life annuity. The lump-sum payment for a previously 
unmortgaged home must be at least $1,000 and less than 8 
percent of the loan value. The reserve account, which is 
limited to the lesser of $7,500 or 3 percent of the equity in 
the home, is designed to cover unexpected expenses. Unlike a 
line of credit, the reserve account cannot be reborrowed? once 
drawn, amounts can be repaid, but not reborrowed. The unused 
portion of the reserve account available increases by 3.5 
percent a year. The annuity feature of the mortgage is 
different from other reverse mortgages. Instead of the lender 
making monthly payments to the borrower, the lender purchases 
an annuity from an insurance company. An advantage of this is 
that the annuity is for life and does not end if the house is 
sold. (Transamerica Homefirst [1993]). Transamerica fails to 
mention three major disadvantages to the use of an annuity:
(1) The annuity not only has an initial closing fee,
but probably is based on a lower interest rate than
the mortgage;
(2) Unlike mortgage payments, the annuity payments may
not be considered income for purposes of computing
public assistance eligibility; and
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(3) Unlike mortgage payments, the interest portion of 
the annuity payments is subject to federal and 
possibly state income taxes.
Ignoring property value limitations, payments under the 
Transamerica plan, given the same interest rates, are similar 
to FHA*s. Using an example furnished by the company,18 
monthly payments would be about 4 percent lower than under the 
FHA plan.
2*4.2 The FHA HECM
In 1987 Congress authorized a demonstration project in 
which HUD could insure 2,500 HECMs through September 30, 1991 
(HUD 1990, 1-3). This program was later increased to allow 25 
thousand HECMs through September 30, 1995 (Roma 1991). As of 
mid-August 1992, 2,155 loans had been closed and 367 loans
were being processed and there were 52 lenders19 in 38 
states offering the FHA HECM mortgage (FHA 1992, ES-1 and ES- 
2). As stated in Section 2.3.4, nearly all HECM loans are 
eventually purchased by the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (FNMA). Wendover Funding, a North Carolina firm 
manages servicing for most HECM lenders. Wendover services or 
sub-services loans for 45 of the 57 institutions that have 
participated in the program.
18Data comes from a one page undated news announcement by 
Transamerica Homefirst.
19Since inception, 57 lenders have participated in the 
program.
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Apparently most lenders do not consider the reverse 
mortgage program to be a major profit center, since most 
lenders transfer both the mortgages and servicing to a third 
party, Although many lenders are interested in the future 
market potential of the product, most lenders view public 
service as the primary reason for participation, according to 
the FHA. Lenders subject to the Community Reinvestment Act 
("CRA”) view the program as a safe way to improve their CRA 
ratings. Finally, lenders believe that they receive positive 
public relations from participating in the program (HUD 1992, 
pp. 3-1 to 3-5).
The FHA demonstration project provides the homeowner with 
a choice of three non-recourse mortgages: (1) a line of
credit mortgage, (2) a term mortgage, and (3) a tenure 
mortgage. Under the FHA program, the homeowner is required to 
repay the loan only if the homeowner dies or if the property 
is not owned and properly maintained20 as the homeowner's 
principal residence,21 but may be pre-paid, without penalty,
20The lender can foreclose on the property if taxes and 
insurance are not being paid or if the homeowner fails to make 
repairs necessary to keep the property in an "acceptable" 
condition (HUD 1989, p. 9-16).
2■’■Homeowners are required to certify annually that the 
home is maintained as a principal residence and should advise 
the lender of all absences from the home in excess of two 
months (HUD 1989, p. 9-15). HUD notes that if the mortgage 
balance exceeds the value of the property, borrowers or their 
heirs may be tempted to fraudulently claim the house as a 
principal residence. HUD suggests that after the program is 
active for a number of years, it may wish to check residence
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at any time (HUD 1989, pp. 9-14 to 9-16) . For term and tenure 
mortgages, the borrower may elect a line of credit set aside, 
but no set aside from the lien of a portion of the house (as 
allowed by Capital Holding and Providential) is permitted.22 
The line of credit can be combined with either a term or 
tenure mortgage. Of the initial 2,155 borrowers, 51.2 percent 
elected the line of credit mortgage, 15.7 percent elected the 
term mortgage and 10.4 elected the tenure mortgage; the 
remaining 22.7 percent elected a term or tenure mortgage with 
a line of credit set aside (HUD 1992, p. 2-18).
The remaining part of this section describe the borrower 
qualifications and loan limits, interest and other charges, 
FHA's model assumptions, and computation of the FHA HECM.
2.4.2.1 Borrower Qualifications and Loan Limits
To be eligible for a reverse mortgage, a borrower must be 
at least age 62 and occupy the home as a principal residence. 
The property must be a single family residence23 free of 
prior liens and must meet HUD property standards (including 
HUD qualification of condominium associations and planned unit
information against social security and tax records.
22A lien set aside is probably not a significant feature 
due to the low property limits on FHA loans.
23HUD (1990, p. 4-7) notes that a self contained rental 
unit in the home would disqualify the property, but a rented 
room would not. Although a duplex would generally not qualify 
for a mortgage, if a separate legal description can be written 
for one half the property, then the HECM mortgage can be 
written for the half occupied by the eligible homeowner.
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developments). The program allows proceeds of the loan to be 
used to pay off existing mortgages or to (a certain extent) 
pay for repairs necessary to meet HUD property standards. 
(HUD 1990, p. 2-2) . Loans may be made to joint owners, 
providing all owners are over age 62. Once made the loan 
would continue to qualify as long as the home was a qualified 
residence for at least one joint owner. For example, the HUD 
(1990, p.4-3) provides as an example that four unrelated 
friends would be eligible for the loan.24
FHA bases its computations on a house's "maximum claim 
amount." Generally, the FHA HECM loan uses the current 
appraised value of the house to determine the maximum claim 
amount. However, if the home value exceeds the maximum FHA 
mortgage for a given area, the maximum claim amount equals the 
amount of the FHA maximum mortgage limitation. The FHA 
maximum mortgage limitation varies from $67,500 to $151,725 
(HUD 1992, p. 1-12).
The statute authorizing the HECM demonstration requires 
potential borrowers to receive counseling from an approved 
third party independent of the lender (HUD 1992, p. 1-10). 
Counseling focuses on the different types of HECMs available, 
the suitability of the HECM for the borrower, and alternatives 
to the HECM (HUD 1989, p. 1-5). Due to the shortage of
24It is not totally clear what would happen if one or 
more of the co-owners transferred their interest to a non-co- 
owner of the property.
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counselors, the counseling requirement has been widely 
criticized as creating a bottleneck in the system. HUD 
recognizes that this problem has made it difficult to begin 
offering FHA HECM mortgages in some areas, particularly rural 
areas (HUD 1992, pp. 4-3 to 4-4). Most of the qualified 
counseling organizations are governmental agencies or non­
profit organizations that are prohibited from charging the 
homeowner. The law prohibits a lender from financing the 
counseling. While HUD reimburses these outside counselors, it 
admits that the reimbursement may be less than actual costs 
(HUD 1992, p. 4-5) .
4.2.2.2 Interest and Other Charges
The FHA does not establish required interest rates. 
Interest rates may be either fixed or variable. For variable 
rates, the lender must use the one year constant maturity, 
U.S. Securities, as the base rate. The rate may be adjusted 
annually with a 2 percentage points annual cap and a 5 
percentage points lifetime cap. Or, it may adjust monthly 
with no annual cap and a lifetime cap set by the lender (HUD 
1989, p. 1-4). Since FNMA purchases all FHA HECM mortgages, 
its policies are critical. FNMA will only purchase variable 
rate mortgages (HUD 1992, p. 3-14). FNMA requires that
mortgages that adjust annually be set 160 basis points above 
the base rate and mortgages that adjust monthly be set 105
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basis points above the base rate (Barriere 1991). J 
Interest accrues using the variable rate. However, for 
purposes of determining amounts that may be loaned, the 
mortgage is treated as if it were a fixed rate mortgage. The 
"as if" rate is the U.S. Treasury Securities rate adjusted to 
a constant maturity of ten years plus the lender's margin (HUD 
1989, p. 1-2). For example, for purposes of determining the 
amount of a tenure HECM annuity that would be paid, an 
annually adjusted loan purchased by FNMA would be considered 
a fixed rate loan with an interest rate 160 basis points above 
the U.S. Treasury Securities rate adjusted to a constant 
maturity of ten years. Interest would continue to accrue at 
a variable rate based on the U.S. Treasury Securities rate 
adjusted to a maturity of one year.
A shared appreciation mortgage is also available, but the 
amount of the appreciation cannot exceed 25 percent of 
original appraised value and cannot cause the effective 
interest rate for the last twelve months of the loan to exceed 
20 percent (HUD 1989, pp. 6-11 to 6-12) . Lenders must also 
co-insure shared mortgages. Due in part to these
limitations, and because FNMA does not purchase shared 
appreciation mortgages, not one shared appreciation mortgage 
has been issued (HUD 1992, p. 3-15).
25Monthly adjustment will maximize the homeowner's loan 
available under the program*
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Lenders may charge borrowers for out-of-pocket costs, 
such as appraisal and title fees plus an origination fee. 
Origination fees are designed to cover the lender's cost for 
originating and closing the loan. Under FHA* s forward 
mortgage program, origination fees are limited to 1 percent of 
the mortgage amount. Under the reverse mortgage program the 
fee itself is not regulated? however, the amount that can be 
financed by the mortgage is limited to 1 percent of the 
maximum claim amount. HUD reports median closing costs of FHA 
HECM mortgages at $2,962, with ranges from $2,000 to $4,400 
(HUD 1992, p. 2-25).
FHA permits, but does not require, lenders to charge 
borrowers a flat monthly fee for servicing the loan. The fee 
is accrued monthly as earned. The standard fee structure 
ranges from $25 to $35 per month (HUD 1992, p. 3-13).
The FHA mortgage insurance premium is 2 percent of the 
maximum claim amount on origination and a monthly fee of 1/2 
percent per year on the mortgage balance (HUD 1989, pp.6-8 to 
6-9). This is a lower premium than that computed by Weinrobe 
(1988), discussed in Section 2.4.1. FHA offers a shared 
premium option, in which the lender participates in the 
insurance premium in exchange for taking part of the risk, but 
no lender to date has agreed to participate under this option. 
Under this option, the lender must hold the mortgage until 
maturity. If the premiums are not shared, the lender may
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assign the loan to the FHA any time after the balance of the 
loan exceeds 98 percent of the maximum claim amount. (HUD 
1992, pp. 1-15 to 1-16). Thus, for a $100,000 house, under 
the FHA limit, the lender would have a "put" on the mortgage 
once the mortgage balance exceeds $98,000. This effectively 
puts a limit on the term of the loan.
4.2.2.3 FHA Model Assumptions
The FHA program has five major model assumptions, all of 
which can be questioned. The first assumption, just 
discussed, is the method of converting variable interest rate 
mortgages to a theoretical fixed rate mortgage for computing 
allowable mortgage amounts. FHA contends that the ten year 
constant maturity rate is the market's best estimate of the 
average interest rate over a ten year period using the one 
year constant maturity rate (Szymanoski 1990, 25) . The
problem with this method is that the FHA receives no premium 
for taking the interest rate risk. If the average interest 
rate is below the ten year rate, the borrower gets the 
benefit. The FHA incurs the loss if the average rate is above 
the ten year rate. Consistent with the FHA1s reasoning from 
financial theory, it should charge an additional premium for 
the difference between the one year and the ten year rates.
The second assumption is that property values will 
increase by 4 percent per annum. This rate is less than that 
used by other programs. For example, as explained in Section
53
2*4*1, Capital Holding assumed that property value would 
increase by 1.3 percentage points higher than the Consumer 
Price Index. The FHA assumed rate of increase is lower than 
Capital Holding's for increases in the Consumer Price Index in 
excess of 2*7 percent* Speare (1992, 4) argues that the 
elderly are likely to have different changes in property 
values than the population at large. They are more likely to 
live where property values are declining or where the rate of 
appreciation is low. Szymanoski (1990) stated that the FHA 
did not find evidence to support this hypothesis* Using data 
from the national longitudinal sample of the Annual Housing 
Surveys from 1974 to 1983, he found that average home 
appreciation was .083 for all homeowners (cr=.017) and .076 
(a=. 016) for the elderly. He concluded that the two rates 
were not significantly different (pp. 30-31).
Additionally, Speare argues that housing values will not 
increase in the future at the same rate as in the last two 
decades, due to the demographics of the "baby boomers*1 
Speare is not the only person concerned with the future growth 
of home values. Mankiw and Weil (1988) concluded in their 
econometric study that real housing prices will fall by 47 
percent by the year 2007* It was also pointed out by Capital 
Holding that one of the reasons for ending its reverse 
mortgage program was a concern over the future growth rate of 
home values.
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Speare further notes that even if FHA's estimate of 
average housing appreciation is correct, the program may still 
lose money due to the variance of the appreciation rate. 
While FHA may incur a loss if a house appreciates less than 4 
percent, it can receive no gain if a house appreciates more 
than 4 percent. He notes, for example, that Wyoming's average 
appreciation rate from 1980 to 1990 was less than 0.5 percent 
per year.
To show the effects of changes in house prices and 
variances, Speare computed the break-even annuity payment that 
would be made under the current FHA model, the FHA model with 
the standard deviation doubled, and the FHA model with the 
house appreciation cut in half. For purposes of computing the 
standard deviation, he assumed that homes which deviate from 
the mean appreciation will continue to do so. FHA uses a 10 
percent standard deviation and a random walk for the 
progression of values on a particular house. He found that a 
2 percent standard deviation under his method provided 
approximately the same monthly annuity as the FHA model. He 
found that annuity payments are extremely sensitive to both 
the standard deviation and the average appreciation rate, 
particularly at younger ages.
Although not pointed out by Speare, his data reveals that 
payments were about twice as sensitive to a reduction in the 
mean appreciation rate than to a proportional increase in the
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standard deviation of returns. For example, a 4 percent 
standard deviation would reduce payments by approximately one- 
quarter and a reduction in the average appreciation rate would 
reduce payments by almost half. At age 80, the higher 
standard deviation would reduce payments by approximately one- 
seventh while the lower average appreciation rate would reduce 
payments by approximately one-quarter. Szymanoski (1990) 
also points that the model is extremely sensitive to changes 
in average property appreciation and somewhat less sensitive 
to changes in its variance.
FHA decided to use the U.S. Decennial Life Tables for 
1979 (female) to compute mortgage payments (Szymanoski 1990, 
11) . Gender specific tables are outlawed by the Civil Rights 
Act of 1968; female tables were chosen as a conservative 
measure (females have longer life expectancy than males) and 
because they expected a large majority of female borrowers 
(HUD 1990, p.5-2). Speare (1992) showed that the model is 
sensitive to mortality assumptions. Speare computed mortality 
using (1) the combined rate of mortality and 
institutionalization observed for females in the Longitudinal 
Study on Aging from 1984 to 1990 and (2) the lowest mortality 
assumed in the Bureau of the Census projections of the U.S. 
population for the year 2005, plus one-half of the rate of 
entering institutions in the Longitudinal Study. He found 
that payments would be significantly reduced using either of
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the assumptions. This is hardly surprising, Archer and Nye 
(1987), discussed in Section 2.4.1, had similar conclusions. 
Szymanoski (1990, 38-42) in developing the FHA plan addressed 
two issues relating to the use of the life mortality table:
(1) adverse selection and (2) trends in future mortality. He 
argued that there is no evidence that the plan would be 
effected by adverse selection or that future trends in 
mortality will significantly benefit the poor elderly. He
suggested that the mortality assumptions may need to be
revised based on the actual data from the demonstration 
project.
Since the FHA reverse mortgage becomes due if the
homeowner moves, the FHA model incorporates a move-out within 
the mortality factor. Szymanoski (1990, 11-12) noted that
studies for the general population suggest that move-out rates 
in relation to mortality decrease with age and range from 51*9 
percent of mortality for those between ages 65-69 to 47 
percent of mortality for those over age 85. The FHA model 
takes an even more conservative position by assuming a
constant move-out rate of 30 percent of mortality for all age 
groups, since those who take out a reverse mortgage are less 
likely to move out than the general population. Thus, the
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probability of program termination (T) at a given age (x) is 
1*3 times the probability of death (q) at the given age;26
Tx = 1.3 qx. (4)
Despite the apparently conservative assumption Speare (1992) 
questions whether it is conservative enough* This is 
important because Szymanoski (1990, 54) found that "the model
26Combining the move-out rate into the mortality rate in 
this manner tends to overstate the move-out rate; the amount 
of the overstatement increases with age* This is the result 
of the law of probabilities. Where q (dying) and m (moving) 
are independent, but not mutually exclusive events, the 
probability of q or m occurring can be stated as:
P = P + P - P P . (1) ^q+m J-m q m ' /
By substituting 1.3q for P(_+in (from the FHA model), and 
solving for Pm the following ^ relationship is obtained:
As the denominator of the above fraction decreases with age, 
the probability of moving becomes a larger percentage of the 
probability of dying*. The relationship at various ages is as 
follows:
Aqe P / P —m—*— -<
65 .304
70 * 307
75 .311
80 .318
85 . 331
90 *352
95 .383
100 .418
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is quite sensitive to changes in the move-out rate." The 
model can also be criticized for not adjusting move-out rates 
for changes in home equity as was done by American Homestead 
(see Section 2.4.1).
The FHA model makes no adjustment for joint ownership. 
Instead, mortgage assumptions for joint ownership are based on 
the youngest joint owner. This is clearly the easiest 
assumption to attack. Szymanoski defends the assumption on 
the bases that (1) the joint lives of owners with a wide age 
disparity are close to the single life of the youngest owner;
(2) no one can predict whether the death or move-out of a 
joint owner will increase the likelihood of move-out by the 
other owner; and (3) the use of female tables is a 
conservative assumption that offsets this risk, in part. The 
primary reason for the assumption is administrative 
convenience. In a report to Congress (HUD 1990, p. 5-2), HUD 
said that the use of joint mortality tables would increase the 
complexity of the computations (which it admits is complicated 
enough) for a group that was expected to obtain only 25 
percent of the mortgages.27 To summarize HUD*s position: 
"Joint borrowers with similar ages do have higher joint 
mortalities, but correcting for this effect at this stage is 
unlikely to substantially affect the actuarial soundness of
27The estimate was fairly accurate. According to HUD 
(1992, p. 2-7), approximately 29 percent of all loans are to 
joint owners.
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the program and would introduce a kind of spurious precision 
given the lack of program experience to guide the choice of 
actuarial assumptions.1
4.2.2.4 Computation of the FHA HECM
The backbone of the FHA model is the concept of 
"principal limit" (See HUD 1989, pp. 6-1 to 6-4) . For a house 
under the FHA limit, the principal limit is computed by taking 
the present value of the house at the expected termination 
date. The discount rate is the expected interest rate plus 
the monthly insurance rate. It is also assumed that the house 
will increase in value by 4 percent per year. For example, 
assuming annual rather than monthly calculations, if a 
homeowner with an expected termination date in ten years 
obtains a 9.5 percent mortgage on a $100,000 house, the 
principal limit is $57,070, computed in two steps. First, the 
expected value of the home on the termination date is the 
future value of the house in ten years using a 4 percent 
appreciation rate? this is $148,024. The $148,024 is 
discounted to its present value at 10 percent (interest plus 
insurance premium) to arrive at $57,070. Initial costs, 
including the 2 percent up-front insurance premium, closing 
costs, and repair costs are subtracted from the principal 
limit to arrive at the "net principal limit." Assuming that 
initial costs include $2,000 of insurance premiums and $2,000 
of other costs, the net principal limit would be $53,070. The
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net principal limit becomes the maximum line of credit 
allowed. For a line of credit mortgage, the net principal 
limit is increased each period by the expected interest rate
and insurance premiums; if a line is not used, the amount of
the line of credit increases each period.
Computing the periodic payments for a term mortgage 
requires three steps* First, the net principal limit of the 
mortgage is determined in the same manner as for a line of 
credit mortgage. If there is a line of credit set-aside, the 
amount of the set-aside is subtracted to arrive at the net 
principal limit associated with the term mortgage (HUD 1989, 
p. 6-8). Next, the amount of the net principal limit at the 
end of the fixed term is determined using the following 
formula;
FVk = PV0 (1 + i)k (5)
where FV is the future value;
PV is the present value; 
k is the number of periods; and
i is the interest rate (including insurance
premium).
The second step is to compute the expected mortgage 
balance (i.e., principal limit) at the end of the term. The 
third step involves taking the expected mortgage balance and 
to compute the periodic payment using Equation 3 in Section
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2.4 (above). A tenure loan is computed as a term loan to age 
100 (HUD 1989, p. 6-6).
2.4.3 Accounting for the Insured HECM
Whereas the SEC has developed rules that make accounting 
for non-insured HECMs very complex (see Section 2.3.1), 
accounting for insured HECMs is very straight forward. The 
mortgagee will add any initial costs to the loan balance 
financed for the borrower, plus any other payments made to the 
borrower, and any interest, insurance premiums, or service 
fees accrued. Net earnings would equal the interest rate on 
the mortgage balance plus any net service fee income. Any 
profits from origination are amortized over the loan term 
(SFAS No. 91 1986, Para. 5). SFAS No. 107 (1991) requires
disclosure of the fair market value of financial assets and 
liabilities.
2*4.4 Taxation of the HECM
The taxation of the financial institution is fairly simple 
as well. As accrual basis taxpayers, the financial 
institutions accrue tax on the interest (and net servicing 
fee) as earned (Reg. Sec. 1.451-128) , the same as for 
accounting income. The same result would be expected for a 
cash basis taxpayer under the original issue discount rules of
28Unless stated otherwise, regulations referenced in this 
paper are Treasury Regulations found in volume 26 of the Code 
of Federal Regulations (CFR).
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sections 1271 to 1275 of the Internal Revenue Code of
2 Q «1986 * Regulation Section 1.451-1 would probably require
the financial institution to accrue income from origination 
fees on closing the loan, because all events necessary to earn 
the income are completed.30
The taxation to the homeowner is also straightforward, 
but not as simple as for the financial institution. The 
homeowner does not include the annuity payments in income; 
they are loans, not income. As a cash basis taxpayer the 
homeowner cannot deduct the accrued interest until it is paid 
[see Reg. Sec. 1.461-1 (a) (1)]. If the homeowner moves out, it 
is paid and the deduction is allowed on the first $100,000 of 
loan balance [IRC Sec. 163(h)(3)(C)(ii)]. Temporary 
Regulation Section 1.163-11T appears to prorate total accrued 
interest between the portion of the loan above and below the 
$100,000 threshold. The same rules would apply if the 
homeowner voluntarily prepaid the mortgage. Upon the 
homeowner's death, the homeowner's successor in interest gets 
the deductions. For purposes of this study, it is assumed the 
home is sold by the estate and all other assets distributed
29In this paper, the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 
volume 2 6 of the U.S. Code is referred to as the "Code" or may 
be In references the Code is abbreviated as "IRC" in 
accordance with convention.
30If the fees are non-refundable, using the same 
regulation, the IRS could argue that the fees are taxable upon 
receipt*
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immediately after the homeowner's death? without income to 
offset, the deductions have no value.
If the homeowner sells the house, gain is generally 
recognized in the amount of the difference between the sales 
price and its adjusted basis. If the value of the house is 
less than the mortgage, than the house is deemed sold for the 
mortgage balance. The homeowner may qualify for the Code 
Section 121 $125,000 one time exclusion on the gain from the 
sale of the house. For purposes of this study, it is assumed 
that the homeowner qualifies.
Since the annuity payments do not affect income, there 
would be no secondary tax effects, such as taxation of Social 
Security income or alternative minimum tax; however, the sale 
of the house could have such an effect.
2.5 Split Interest
Under a split interest ("SI") plan, the homeowner sells 
a remainder interest in the home, while retaining a life 
estate. The proceeds of the sale are generally taken as a 
future series of annuity payments, although a lump-sum payment 
is possible. The annuity should either provide that the life 
tenant pays the costs of home maintenance and receives a 
larger annuity to pay for increased expenses or provide that 
the remainder interest pay for home maintenance, while 
reducing the life tenant's fixed annuity. "In either of these 
arrangements the party who benefits from appreciation on the
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property stands the burden of rising expenses (Guttentag 1980, 
86)." Turner et al. (1982) note that since investors' 
returns are deferred until death and since returns are 
difficult to predict, private investors shy away from this 
type of plan. For financial institutions, uncertain or 
unfavorable accounting and tax implications can be added to 
the list.
The remainder of this discussion is divided into the 
following sections:
History of the SI plan;
Accounting for the SI plan;
Taxation of the SI plan; and 
Other policy aspects of the SI plan.
2*5*1 History of the SI Plan
There has been no successful attempt to market a for 
profit SI plan (Scholen 1992, 271). Some charitable
organizations do have a form of SI, but it generally involves 
a contribution of all or part of the remainder interest to the 
charitable organization (Scholen 1991, 37) . Code Section
170(f)(3) allows a charitable deduction for contributions of 
a remainder interest in a personal residence or farm. In 
general, contributions of remainder interests in most property 
would not qualify for the charitable deduction.31 The
31Code Section 170(f) also permits a charitable deduction 
for the transfer of a remainder interest that qualifies under 
Code section 170(h) as a qualified conservation contribution
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charity generally provides an annuity (called a charitable 
gift annuity) that will produce a charitable deduction of 40 
to 60 percent (Taylor 1992, 361). Taylor suggests that for 
some high income taxpayers, the charitable gift annuity can 
produce a higher annuity than some reverse mortgages,32 A 
split purchase (a form of SI) has been touted as a tax shelter 
(see Auster 1990; Auster 1993a; Auster 1993b), but is not 
widely used.33
One of the first studies of an SI plan was conducted by 
Chen (1973). The study focused on a survey of Los Angeles 
residents between the ages of 55 to 75. The study was 
designed to test the degree of interest in the plan, 
categories of persons interested in the plan, and categories 
of persons not interested in the plan. Only 9 percent (41 of 
455) of the respondents expressed some interest in the plan; 
seven respondents expressed great interest in the plan with 
the remainder being somewhat interested. Given the low level
or is the donor's entire interest in the property. A 
charitable contribution is also allowed for a remainder 
interest in the charity if the' contribution is to a charitable 
remainder annuity trust, charitable remainder unitrust, or a 
pooled income fund (all specific trusts that must meet 
specific Code requirements, intended to discourage tax 
avoidance).
32The reason for this appears to be that the life estate 
is generally discounted at a lower rate than the interest rate 
used for uninsured reverse mortgages.
33The joint purchase tax shelter is not applicable to the 
joint purchase of the life tenant's personal residence.
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of interest in the plan, Chen found five characteristics that 
were more likely to occur in the group that expressed interest 
in the plan than in the group that was not interested (some of 
which are surprising). The characteristics were: (1) having
an existing mortgage, (2) having inadequate income, (3) being 
under age 65, (4) being without family, and (5) having an
internal (rather than external) psychological profile.34
To increase the validity of the study, the respondents 
were given the estimated income they would receive in exchange 
for the remainder interest in the house. To do this, Chen's 
plan had specific assumptions. In determining the value of 
the remainder interest and annuity, a 5 percent interest rate 
was used throughout. It was assumed that land values would 
increase by 5 percent each year, but the home itself would 
depreciate 4 percent each year on a straight line basis (i.e., 
a 25 year life)* The homeowner would receive a life annuity 
with 10 years certain; married couples were given a joint life 
annuity. The annuity was computed using gender based annuity 
tables. The homeowner could withdraw from the transaction by
34Thus, a significant finding indicates that a given
characteristic is more prevalent amongst interested homeowners 
than occurs in the public at large. The characteristics are 
not predictive; interested persons composed less than 18
percent of those with each of the characteristics. It also 
does not necessarily indicate that the characteristic occurs 
in a significant percentage of interested homeowners. For
example, only 13 of 41 interested homeowners were without
families.
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repaying annuity payments plus interest.35 Finally, the 
plan allowed a set aside, so that the remainderperson would 
receive only part of the property on the homeowner's 
death.36
In 1982 Buffalo instituted an SI plan, called the Home 
Equity Living Plan ("HELP") . HELP has a three fold purpose:
(1) relieving financial burdens of the elderly, (2) improving 
the housing stock, particularly in certain neighborhoods with 
a large elderly population, and (3) creating a self- 
sustaining permanent program* As is clear from the 
objectives, the HELP program is generally limited to lower 
income homeowners in low income neighborhoods (i.e., 
inexpensive homes). Under HELP, a non-profit corporation 
acquires the remainder interest in the elderly homeowner's and 
in exchange the corporation does the following: (1)
rehabilitates the house, (2) pays all expenses of major 
maintenance, insurance and taxes, and (3) makes a fixed
35This indicates that the homeowners did not fully 
understand Chen1s proposal. This provision makes the 
transaction a "heads I win, tails you lose" situation for the 
homeowner. If conditions are favorable to the remainderman 
(e.g., home value increase more than expected or the person 
expects to die before reaching life expectancy), the homeowner 
buys back the remainder at a favorable price. Otherwise, the 
homeowner lets the remainderperson get the property.
36While this provision allows the homeowner to sell only 
that portion of the house that is necessary for additional 
income, it leads to the impractical result of the owner of the 
remainder interest sharing an interest in the home with the 
homeowner's heirs. This is not a desirable outcome for either 
the remainderperson or the heirs.
68
annuity payment to the homeowner. After the homeowner dies, 
the house can be resold to provide capital to fund another 
homeowner (Garnett and Guttentag 1982). Although payments 
were initially limited to annuity payments, the current plan 
allows for lump-sum payments or an exchange of payments for 
essential services, such as for transportation or home nursing 
(Scholen 1991).
The HELP model contains some interesting assumptions 
which could be considered extremely generous. First, in order 
not to discourage some of those in most need of HELP, a 
formula was used for rehabilitation costs. The modelers 
conceded that the use of a formula could cause a problem of 
adverse selection. Second, the model assumes that house 
values will increase by 6 percent a year, a rate that is much 
higher than most other models. The exact methodology is 
unclear, but it appears that remainder interests are 
discounted at 6 percent per year based on current value and 
cash reserves are deemed to earn 12 percent per year (giving 
a total return of 11.66 percent, including appreciation). It 
also appears that standard annuity tables were used, with 
appropriate adjustment for joint lives (Garnett and Guttentag 
1981). With such liberal assumptions, one would not expect 
the plan to be successful. However, a Buffalo counselperson 
advised in a telephone conversation on June 1, 1993 that the
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plan is quite successful. It continues to fund 60 homes37 
worth $1.9 million (up from $1.6 on inception). It is not 
clear whether the program is as successful as the 
counselperson believes. An increase in value of $0.3 million 
over ten years represents an increase in value of 2 percent 
per year, not 6 percent as expected. It is possible that HELP 
is dying a slow death.
2.5.2 Accounting for the SI Plan
In the SI plan, the financial institution purchases a 
remainder interest (an asset) in exchange for an annuity (a 
liability). To account for the plan, the financial 
institution separately accounts for the remainder interest and 
the annuity. There is no accounting authority advising how to 
account for the remainder interest. There are three possible 
methods to account for the remainder interest and the costs 
associated with holding the remainder interest: (1) costs of 
holding the interest are expensed immediately (other than true 
capital expenditures) and no revenue is recognized for the 
reduced life estate of the homeowner; (2) costs of holding the 
interest (including annuity costs) are capitalized and no 
revenue is recognized for the reduced life estate of the 
homeowner; and (3) costs of holding the interest are expensed 
immediately and revenue is recognized over time for the
37Garnett and Guttentag (1982) anticipated the program to 
fund 80 homes.
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reduced life estate of the homeowner* It appears that the 
first option is closest to the GAAP model, even though the 
model does not closely reflect the economics of the plan. 
Income is recognized only on the sale of the property. This 
follows historical cost and is conservative. It appears that 
FAS 34 prohibits the capitalization of costs during the life 
tenancy: "The historical cost of acquiring an asset includes
the costs necessarily incurred to bring it to the condition 
and location necessary for its intended use [emphasis 
provided]." For example, interest to hold land not under 
development cannot be capitalized (FAS 34, Para. 11). The 
home in an SI is already in the condition and location
necessary for its intended use. The third method of
accounting, which leads to the best matching of revenue and 
expense, does not appear to be supported by GAAP. Although 
the principles of FAS 60 should apply to this type of
transaction, there is no evidence that the statement is
intended to apply to all transactions requiring actuarial 
computations.
Unlike the treatment of the remainder interest, it 
appears that FAS 60 should be followed for the treatment of 
the liability to pay an annuity. FAS 60 requires that the 
cost of annuity payments be the difference between the present 
value of the annuity at the beginning of the year and the 
present value of the annuity at the end of the year
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(considering the annuitant's new life expectancy). Any 
payments above that amount serve to reduce the liability 
account. Although FAS 60 is applicable only to insurance 
companies, it is reasonable to assume that it would apply to 
other businesses issuing insurance products.
2.5.3 Taxation of the SI Plan
Some tax aspects of the SI plan are not settled. It is 
not clear whether the absence of clear rules is due to the 
lack of interest by the public or whether the tax authorities 
wish to make the consequences unclear to discourage Sis * The 
reason for the uncertainty may not be clear, but the effect is 
clear. Uncertain tax consequences increase the risk of the 
transaction. To compensate for the increased risk, an 
investor will require a higher return, which makes the plan 
less attractive compared with other choices.
Although the taxation of an SI is not settled, a strong 
argument can be made that a financial institution purchasing 
a remainder interest is acquiring a capital asset (see IRC 
Sec. 1221), the sale of which (or the entire home, after the 
termination of the life estate) is subject to the capital 
gains tax.38 Although corporations are subject to the same 
tax rate on capital gains as ordinary income, it is 
advantageous to classify the income as capital gains because
O QJOThe IRS could argue that the interests purchased 
constitute inventory to the financial institution, and 
therefore ineligible for capital gains treatment.
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it can offset capital losses from other sources. Corporations 
may only deduct capital losses to the extent of capital 
gains.39 The annual increases in value due to the depletion 
of the life estate is not subject to taxation.
The homeowner cannot receive the $125,000 exclusion on 
the sale of a residuary interest. Revenue Ruling 84-43, 1984- 
1 C.B. 24, held that Code section 121 only applies if the 
elderly person disposes of his/her entire interest in the 
property. Thus, under current law, the SI is not appropriate 
if the person has a large gain on the sale of the house. If 
the payments were in the form of a mortgage, the installment 
sale rule of Code section 453 could be used; however, since 
the SI payment is in the form of an annuity, the tax would be 
immediately payable.40 Unlike the reverse mortgage, the 
annuity payments are subject to tax. The taxation of annuity
39Capital losses not deductible in the current year may 
be carried back against net capital gains in the three 
preceding taxable years and carried forward against net 
capital gains in the succeeding 5 years (IRC Sec. 1212). 
Capital losses not deducted during this nine-year period are 
disallowed.
4°Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43, would permit deferral 
of the gain if this were a private annuity? a private annuity 
must be an unsecured mere promise to pay. The rule is based 
on the premise that this type of annuity cannot be fairly 
valued [GCM 37371 (1977)]. For example, Estate of Llovd G.
Bell v. Commissioner. 60 T.C. 469 (1973), held that a secured 
promise to pay would not permit deferral of the gain. The 
case also noted that some commentators have said that the 
annuity must be issued by one who does not regularly issue 
annuities. It is unlikely that an annuity from a financial 
institution, even if uninsured, would qualify for private 
annuity status*
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payments is subject to the rules of Code section 72, which 
bifurcate the annuity payments between income and return of 
capital based on the annuitant's life expectancy* This 
bifurcation is known as the "exclusion ratio." Once 
established, the income percentage remains constant until the 
annuitant's life expectancy is reached; after which, the 
entire annuity payment is taxed. If the annuitant dies before 
reaching the life expectancy, the remaining basis is 
deductible on the annuitant's final return as an itemized 
deduction not subject to the two percent floor under Code 
section 67(a) [IRC Sec. 67(b)(11)].
Senator Arlen Specter introduced S. 831 on March 16, 
1983. The bill provided that the sale of a remainder interest 
in a personal residence would be eligible for the section 121 
exclusion. In addition, the bill would have allowed the 
purchaser of the remainder to treat the transaction as the 
sale of the entire interest, allowing the purchaser to 
depreciate the property. According to Richard D'Avino, 
Attorney/Advisor, Office of Tax Policy, the Treasury 
Department officially supported the expansion of section 121, 
but was opposed to allowing the remainderperson a depreciation 
deduction. (U.S. Congress 1985, 73-79).
2*5.4 Other Policy Aspects of the SI Plan
The split interest plan has some beneficial features not 
available in a reverse mortgage. First, by transferring
74
increased costs of maintenance, insurance and taxes to the 
financial institution, the homeowner is protected against 
inflation of these housing costs. Second, the homeowner is 
protected against unforseen or unusual costs, such as 
hurricane damage or the replacement of a roof (this is in 
contrast to the reverse mortgage where the homeowner may be 
forced to vacate the premises due to inability to pay for 
these costs). Finally, an elderly homeowner may wish to 
relieve the family from the responsibility of selling the 
house after death.
An apparent problem with the SI plan is that annuities 
received could constitute income for purposes of determining 
eligibility for Supplemental Security Income. However, the 
American Bar Association convinced the Social Security 
Administration not to count the annuity given by Arkansas HELP 
(a plan modeled after Buffalo's HELP) as income for that 
purpose (ABA 1986, 14).
Sis cannot be easily securitized into a passive 
investment that can be sold to the public. However, Sis can 
be securitized by splitting the transaction into two 
components: the remainder interest (asset) and the annuity
(liability). Remainder interests can be bundled into 
portfolios operated as partnerships. The partnership units 
would then be sold to non-profit organizations, pension plans,
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and others41 interested in investing in single family 
housing.
2•6 Sale-Leaseback
In a sale-leaseback ("SL"), the homeowner sells his/her 
home to an investor, taking back a mortgage (or an annuity). 
The investor then rents the house back to the homeowner under 
a fixed long-term lease or for life. The homeowner receives 
mortgage or annuity payments from which he/she pays rent. 
Although an SL can be structured as a net lease, where the 
tenant pays all expenses of the property, its chief advantage 
is that it can also be structured so that the tenant is not 
responsible for maintenance. This offers partial protection 
against inflation. Since SLs have been used principally as 
tax shelters, it has been difficult to develop an SL plan that 
is favorable to the homeowner and the investor while meeting 
IRS standards for a valid SL.
The remainder of this discussion is divided into the 
following sections:
History of the sale-leaseback plan;
Accounting for the sale-leaseback;
Taxation of the sale-leaseback; and 
Other policy aspects of the sale-leaseback.
41It would be of interest, for example, to corporations 
with histories of capital losses exceeding capital gains. 
Since the remainder interest has a built in capital gain, the, 
income could be considered tax free.
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2.6.1 History of the Sale-Leaseback Plan
The SL plan has a short history with a limited number of 
actual structured transactions. The Fouratt Corporation, a 
California real estate broker, is generally credited with 
developing the first SL plan not involving related parties in 
1979* Under the Fouratt Senior Equity Plan (also called the 
Fouratt Plan), an investor purchased an elderly homeowner's 
home at a discount from market value. The discount, which 
depended on the age of the homeowner, varied from 15 to 30 
percent depending on the life expectancy of the homeowner (the 
longer the life expectancy the higher the discount). The 
seller would provide a small down payment (generally 10 
percent) with the remainder in a 10- to 15-year mortgage. The 
buyer also purchased a deferred annuity to provide the 
homeowner with payments once the mortgage was repaid. 
Independent appraisers determined a range of fair market rent 
for the property and a rent in the lower end of the range was 
generally used. After three years the rent was increased by 
40 percent of the homeowner's increase in retirement income 
(e.g., Social Security). The seller-lessee paid for 
maintenance that did not exceed 10 percent of rent in a given 
month. Buyers were responsible for the rest (Henry 1980).
Using data from the 1977 Annual Housing Survey, Jacobs 
(1982) found that for all elderly homeowners 50 percent would 
increase their income by at least $600 per year by using a
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reverse mortgage.42 Twenty-three percent would increase 
their income by at least $1,200 per year. Using the Fouratt 
Plan, a slightly smaller percentage would increase their 
income by at least $600 (49 percent). However, a much larger 
percentage would increase their income by $1,200 (40 percent). 
Surprisingly, he found that the Fouratt Plan produced a 
greater effect for those under age 75 than those over age 75.
The San Francisco Development Fund instituted a home 
equity conversion program in 1981. The fund acted as broker 
between the homeowner and an investor or financial 
institution. It offered reverse annuity mortgages (RAMs)43 
and SLs. While it arranged 118 RAMs from 1981 to 1985, only 
8 SLs were arranged. The SLs followed the Fouratt Plan (HUD 
1985, 108).
Family-Backed Mortgage Association (FBMA), a for profit 
mortgage company, offered an SL called the Golden Retirement 
Annuity Mortgage or "Grannie Mae." Under Grannie Mae, an 
investor, generally a child of the homeowner, purchased the 
home from the homeowner using a conventional mortgage (except 
that the mortgage was subordinated to the seller's lease).
42The mortgage provided a sufficient annuity to reach 80 
percent of initial home value at the end of the homeowner's 
life expectancy. In addition, a deferred annuity was 
purchased to continue the payments to the homeowner and to pay 
the mortgagee interest on the mortgage after that date. The 
mortgage was not due until the homeowner died.
43The RAM program was discussed in Section 2.4.1 above.
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The proceeds of the loan and down payment were used to 
purchase an annuity from an insurance company. The seller 
paid a fixed rent that included all maintenance, taxes and 
insurance. The plan was generally only applicable to family 
arrangements because the plan required the seller to find the 
purchaser and the latter would incur a negative cash flow 
during the tenancy of the seller (HUD 1 985, 111).
2.6*2 Accounting for the Sale-Leaseback
For accounting purposes, besides the initial accounting 
for the purchase of the building, the accounting rules for an 
SL consist of two parts: (1) accounting for the lease under
FAS 13 and (2) accounting for the annuity payments using FAS 
60. FAS 13 would require the lessor to treat the lease as an 
operating lease, since the lease would meet none of paragraph 
7's requirements of a capital lease by the lessee (see Para. 
8) . An operating lease is accounted for as a "true" lease 
(e.g., rents are rents and the property is depreciated 
following the general rules of depreciating property); 
insurance would not affect this result. There is no provision 
for the accrual of the increase in the guaranteed sales price. 
FAS 60 requires that the cost of annuity payments be the 
difference between the present value of the annuity at the 
beginning of the year and the present value of the annuity at 
the end of the year (considering the annuitant's new life 
expectancy); any payments above that amount act to reduce the
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liability account. Although FAS 60 is applicable only to 
insurance companies, it is reasonable to assume that it would 
apply to other businesses issuing insurance products.
2*6.3 Taxation of Sale-Leasebacks
The tax treatment of the buyer-lessor of an SL 
transaction is well defined. The buyer obtains a cost basis 
in the property under Code section 1012. Income from the 
lease would be calculated after deducting ordinary and 
necessary business expenses under Code section 162. This is 
generally the same as for financial reporting (except for 
depreciation). Depreciation of the building is based on a
27.5 year life under Code section 168(c)(1). The taxation of 
the annuity contract is similar to that for financial 
reporting (see IRC Sec. 807) .
The IRS has taken the position that an SL transaction 
will be respected if it meets the following tests:
(1) The home is sold at fair market value (discounts 
are deemed to be prepaid rent)?
(2) The lease provides a fair market value rent;
(3) The title to the property is transferred to the
purchaser?
(4) The lease is not a lifetime lease (see below);
(5) The transaction is entered into for profit;
(6) The seller does not have an option to repurchase 
the property below-market value; and
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(7) The purchaser has all the responsibilities of 
ownership (taxes, maintenance, and insurance) and 
receives all appreciation in the building (HUD 
1985, 71-72)*
The first issue for the seller-lessee is the availability 
of Code section 121, which exempts the first $125,000 of gain 
from principal residences. The IRS has suggested that if the 
leaseback is for the life of the seller-lessee, then the 
transaction would likely be recharacterized as a sale of a 
remainder interest (U.S. Congress 1985), which is not eligible 
for the Code section 121 exclusion.44 If the transaction is 
treated as an SL for tax purposes, any gain over the exclusion 
would be subject to tax. As with the SI, if the payments are 
in the form of a mortgage, the installment sale rules of Code 
section 453 can be used; however, if the payment is in the 
form of an annuity, the tax would be immediately payable. The 
taxation of annuity payments was discussed under taxation of 
split interests (Section 2.5.3). The taxation of the annuity 
is less favorable than for an SI. In an SI, only part of the 
property is exchanged for an annuity; in an SL the entire
44It is not clear whether the use of a fixed term lease 
that extends beyond a homeowner's life expectancy would be 
treated in the same manner. However, if a term lease is for 
30 years or more, the IRS would likely take the position that 
the lease is a retained interest in the property [see Reg. 
Sec. 1.1031 (a) -1 (c) ] . As a result, the Code section 121 
exclusion would be denied, but the transaction would be 
treated as an SL for tax purposes.
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property is exchanged for an annuity, which is offset directly 
by non-deductible rent. This makes the SL the least favorable 
plan for the homeowner from a tax standpoint.
On October 3, 1983, Senator Arlen Specter introduced S. 
1914, which focused on the tax aspects of SLs used for home 
equity conversions. The Fouratt Plan did not meet the IRS's 
requirements for a bona fide SL arrangement? therefore, the 
tax consequences were not clear. S. 1914 provided safe harbor 
rules and leases that met the safe harbor rules would be 
considered sales at fair market value followed by true leases. 
For example, the homeowner would be eligible for the section 
121 exclusion and the buyer would not be required to include 
the market discount as prepaid rent. In addition, the bill 
would exempt the transaction from the "anti-churning" 
provisions of the ACRS depreciation rules, allowing the buyer 
to use the favorable ACRS depreciation rates.45 The safe 
harbor tests were consistent with the terms of the Fouratt 
Plan. Except for the provisions relating to Code section 
121,46 the Treasury was opposed to S. 1914 (U.S. Congress
1985, 78-79).
45The "anti-churning provisions are no longer applicable 
to residential rental property [IRC Sec. 168(f)(5)(B)].
46The brief statement by the Treasury clearly indicated 
that the department was not opposed to granting a Code section 
121 exclusion where the homeowner sold the property and 
received back a lifetime lease. It was not clear whether the 
Treasury also agreed to treat the lease as a true lease to the 
buyer-lessor.
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An amended version of S. 1914 was included in the
Senate's version of the Deficit Reduction Bill of 1984. The 
bill provided that the provision would not apply to 
transactions between related individuals47 and tax shelters. 
The bill would also have required that the sales price of the 
residence be fair market value (which is inconsistent with the 
Fouratt Plan) . Finally the purchaser would have to use a 40- 
year depreciable life, which was far longer than the 
depreciable lives available under the tax law. In short, the 
Senate, while accepting its general provisions, destroyed S. 
1914 in the details. The provision was later eliminated from 
the final bill in conference (U.S. Congress 1985, 79) .
For purposes of this research it is assumed that the 
transactions qualify as true SLs and are not taxed as Sis. 
2*6.4 Other Policy Aspects of the Sale-Leaseback
The SL is similar in many respects to the SI. It can 
provide the elderly seller-lessee with inflation protection by 
means of a fixed rent, relief against unexpected costs, and 
freedom from property management. It also avoids estate 
problems relating to the home, since the property has been 
sold. Like the SI, the transaction cannot be securitized but 
can be split between the asset (the leased property) and the
47A SL is often used in intra-family tax planning. For 
example Murphy (1992) found that from a family perspective, an 
intra-family SL with financially capable heirs would be 
preferable to using a reverse mortgage.
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liability (the annuity). Finally, like the SI, the annuity 
may be considered income for determining eligibility for SSI *
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CHAPTER ITT 
METHODOLOGY
The methodology employed in this research uses Monte 
Carlo simulation with an after-tax discounted cash flow model. 
In the model, an elderly homeowner purchases a home for cash 
and immediately thereafter enters into a home equity 
conversion ("HEC") plan. This avoids questions relating to the 
taxation of built-in gains at the commencement of the HEC, 
which would be different for each taxpayer. Similar to Archer 
and Nye (1987) and Tate (1987) , the home value is set at 
$100,000, which is assumed to be below the FHA limit. Other 
than actuarial assumptions, all model parameters are fixed? 
however, separate computations are provided for alternative 
tax rates and homeowner's ages. At the end of the homeowner's 
tenure (move-out or death) , the property is sold at 90 percent 
of fair market value (transaction costs on sale are set at 10 
percent of market value).48 The present value of housing 
costs and the return to the financial institution and the 
insurer (FHA) are then computed. Four plans are considered. 
The first is a standard FHA tenure HECM. The remaining three
48The FHA assumption that the house is sold at fair 
market value is retained as the base case when testing the 
sensitivity of the FHA model to its assumptions.
plans are designed to achieve, as closely as possible, the 
same basic pre-tax economics: a growth HECM, a split interest 
plan ("SI") , and a sale-leaseback ("SL"). These alternatives 
to the HECM are used to assess the economic and financial 
consequences to the homeowner, the financial institution, and 
the FHA relating to the homeowner's selection of a financing 
plan.
A single net present value ("NPV") model is used to 
assess the economic consequences to all subjects, i, in the 
financing plan ( the homeowner, the financial institution, and 
the FHA):
NPVi = f [Entity (ENT), Plan (PLAN), Initial Age (IA),
Actuarial Assumptions (ACT), Death Year (DY), 
Move-out Year (MY), Interest Rate (INT), FHA 
Insurance Rate (FHA), Initial Home Value 
(IHV), Closing Costs (CC), Home Appreciation 
Rate (HAR), Inflation Rate (INF), Discount 
Rate (DR), Property Operating Costs (POC), 
Plan Servicing Costs (SC), Tax Rate (TRATE), 
Accounting Rules (AR), Tax Rules (TR)].
The remainder of the chapter is divided into the
following parts:
Overview of the methodology;
Descriptions of HEC plans;
Model variables and assumptions; and 
Model tests and hypotheses.
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3.1 Overview of the Methodology
This research is conducted in four steps.
Step 1. Cumulative mortality tables are constructed
from the government life tables at age 65. In 
keeping with the FHA model assumptions, 
cumulative move-out rates are computed at 30% 
of mortality. This process is repeated for 
ages 70, 75, 80, and 85.
Step 2. Monte Carlo simulation determines the relative
life expectancy and move-out potential for one 
thousand individuals. Both life expectancy 
and move-out expectations are uniform 
distributions with possible values between 
zero and one and are independent of each 
other.
Step 3. The relative life and move-out expectancies of
each individual (Step 2) are converted to a 
fixed age using the tables produced by Step 1. 
The fixed death and move-out ages become the 
input data for Step 4. This step is repeated 
for each base age assumption.
Step 4. The economic consequences to each entity are
computed for each simulation using the data 
from Step 3. Separate simulations are 
required for each plan, base age, and 
appreciation rate. An expected cash flow is 
found by adding each period's cash flow for 
each simulation and dividing by the number of 
simulations.
For example, a homeowner at age 65 obtains an HECM 
mortgage* The homeowner dies at age 70 and the move-out date 
is age 75 (where the homeowner dies on or before the move-out 
date, only the date of death is significant) . The computation
of cash flows is calculated as follows:
(1) At age 65, the homeowner has a negative cash flow 
of $100,000 for the house. In addition, the
homeowner incurs $2,000 in closing costs and
mortgage insurance, respectively.
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(2) From age 66 to 70, the homeowner receives an HECM 
payment (net of mortgage administration costs) from 
which house operating costs are subtracted.
(3) At age 70, the house is sold at 90% of fair market 
value, and the homeowner receives a payment equal 
to the sales price net of the outstanding mortgage 
balance (but not below zero).
(4) Because the homeowner dies without selling the
home, there are no tax effects (since estate taxes 
are ignored) . If the homeowner had moved out at 
age 70 and died at age 75, the homeowner would be 
entitled to a deduction for the current real estate 
taxes and all interest (including interest,
administration fees, and mortgage insurance)
incurred for the life of the mortgage, subject to 
limitations. The homeowner would also have to pay 
tax on any gain on the sale over $125,000.
(5) The NPV of the cash flows of the homeowner is
computed assuming no tax, 15% tax, and 28% tax. 
This information is retained for further analysis. 
The cash flow for each year is computed in a 
separate account to be aggregated for all
homeowners.
(6) Steps 1 to 5 above are repeated for each homeowner 
in the simulation.
(7) After all homeowners1 yearly cash flow is computed, 
the grand totals are averaged by the number of 
homeowners (1,000). This results in an expected 
cash flow for each year. The expected cash flow 
can be discounted by the appropriate discount rate 
to get an NPV of the flows, with and without tax.
3.2 Descriptions of the HEC Plans
As previously stated, this research compares the FHA HECM
with three alternative plans that are not presently available:
a growth HECM mortgage, an SI? and an SL. Each of the three
alternative plans is designed to provide the homeowner with
inflation protection, which is not available in the current
FHA plan.
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3.2.1. FHA Home Equity Conversion Mortgage
The FHA HECM plan is a tenure plan assuming the maximum 
allowed annuity payments. Interest is computed using an 
interest rate of 8 percent, before FHA mortgage costs. In 
addition to the FHA insurance of 2 percent of value, costs of 
2 percent of value are deducted from the principal sum. 
Although the FHA permits the financial institution to transfer 
the loan to the FHA once the loan reaches 98 percent of the 
maximum claim amount ($98,000 for homes in this study), the 
mortgages are assumed to be held to maturity.
3.2.2 Growth Home Equity Conversion Mortgage
The growth HECM uses the same assumptions as the FHA 
plan, but instead of the HECM annuity payments, payments in 
the growth HECM remain constant throughout the year, but 
increase 4 percent a year for the entire term of the mortgage. 
By providing inflation protection, this graduated plan is more 
similar to the SL and SI plans than the flat payment plan*
The initial payment for the growth HECM is computed using 
the future value of a growth annuity of $1 (11FVGA") :
(1 + im)n _ ±FVGAkifftQ = (1 +
where k is the nominal interest rate, 
g is the growth rate, and 
i* = (l + k)/(l + g) .
(6)
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The FVGA can be derived be adding growth to the future value 
of an annuity of $1 ("FVA") formula*49
49The annuity in a standard HECM is computed using the 
future value of annuity formula (FVA):
FVAkta = £  Cl+Jc)^1,
t=i
which can be expressed as:
FVAk = (1 + k)0 + (1+k)1 + (1 + k)n~1
(1)
(2)
If growth value, g, is incorporated into Equation 2, the 
future value of the annuity is:
FVGAk,g,n (l+k)° (l+g)n + + (1+k)15-1 (1 + g)
(1 + g)a [<l+*)° (l+gr) ]
Equation 4 can be rearranged as
FVGAk, n, g = (i +g)n7 1 + k\° + 11 + k\1\l+gj \l+gj
11+kV-1 
\l+91
(4)
(5)
By letting 1 + i* equal (1 + k)/ (1 + g) , the formula 
becomes:
FVGAr (l+g)D[(l+i*)° + (1 +i*)1 + . . , + (1 + i*)n_r (6)
Equation 6 can be expressed in terms of the FVA formula
as:
FVGAk.g.n (l +g)n • FVAr (7)
The FVA portion of Equation 7 can be expressed in a 
standard mathematical equivalence to yield:
(1 +i*5 - 1 (8)
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If the future value is known, the theoretical payment at 
time zero can be obtained by dividing the future value 
by the FVGA factor. The first payment is equal to the payment 
at time zero times one, plus the growth rate.
For purposes of this study, it is assumed that the growth 
mortgage balance will be equal to the standard mortgage 
balance at its theoretical termination at age 100. Therefore, 
the annual payments for the growth mortgage are computed by 
applying the FVGA formula to the mortgage balance of the 
standard mortgage at age 100.
3-2.3. Split Interest
Under the SI plan, the financial institution purchases a 
remainder interest for the present value of the property 
(based on the individual1s age) based on a discount rate of
8.5 percent (which includes the insurance premium)■ Closing 
costs, paid by the homeowner, are $4,000 ($2,000 of which are 
paid to the insurance company). The net payment is used to 
purchase an annual life annuity computed at an 8 percent 
interest rate. The homeowner pays the current property 
operating costs? the financial institution pays any increases 
in operating costs. The FHA provides insurance for the same 
amount as the standard FHA HECM and insurance premiums are the 
same. If the homeowner moves out of the house, the value of 
the remainder interest in the home (assuming no appreciation) 
is converted to a life annuity at an 8 percent rate, but based
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on the life expectancy of the homeowner at the time of the 
move-out.
3*2.4. Sale-Leaseback
Under the SL plan, the homeowner sells the property to 
the financial institution for $100,000, less the FHA insurance 
fees and closing costs* The homeowner pays rent equal to the 
deemed interest cost of 8*5 percent (which includes insurance 
costs) of $100,000 plus estimated operating costs at current 
prices. In addition, the homeowner receives a life annuity 
with a value of $96,000, based on an interest rate of 8 
percent* Insurance coverage is initially equal to the value 
of the home, increasing by 4 percent per year and costs 0.5 
percent of coverage.
3 * 3 Variables and Assumptions of the Model
The research uses an ex post net present value of cash 
flows for each subject to measure the relative attractiveness 
of each plan to each entity.50 Net present value of cash 
flows for a particular subject is defined as follows:
no
NPVCFent = CFi(l*y)m ~i (7)
i-IA
where CF is the cash flow;
50Since each of the plans has features not measured by 
this research, it is possible that a plan with a low cash flow 
can have a high utility. For example, if it is important to 
relieve the heirs of the duty to sell the home, the homeowner 
may wish to use an SI or SL plan, even if the net present 
value of cash flows were less favorable than a mortgage plan.
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IA is the initial age of subject; and 
y is the discount (interest) rate*
Financial institutions are not only interested in cash 
flow, but also in accounting income* The timing of cash flows 
and accounting income can often differ, although over the life 
of the loan, the two will have the same cumulative totals. 
This research uses the net present value of accounting flows 
to measure the timing benefits of accounting income. The 
present value of accounting income (NPVAI) is computed using 
the same formula as NPVCF, except that accounting income (AI) 
is used instead of cash flow (CF).
The surrogate for measuring the ex ante attractiveness of
a particular plan is the expected value of the net present
value of cash flow:
n 110E  E  C F ^U + y^-i
E iN P V C F ) Em  =  —  ----------------- ---- ---------------------------------------------
where n is the number of loans.
As with the NPVAI, the E (NPVAI) is the same formula as
E(NPVCF), except that accounting income is substituted for 
cash flow.
A secondary measure of attractiveness for financial 
institutions is the internal rate of return of expected cash 
flows ("IRR"). The IRR is the discount rate (y) required to 
produce an E(NPVCF) of zero. The IRR of accounting income is
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not used because it leads to an undefined result for mortgage 
plans.
3 *4 Model Variables and Assumptions
The variables used in the model are listed in the
generalized model at the beginning of this chapter. The 
variables Entity (ENT) and Plan (PLAN) were discussed 
previously. The remainder of the variables will be discussed 
in this section*
3*4*1 Initial Age
The initial age (IA) is the subject's age at the start of 
the plan. All subjects are deemed to start the plan at the 
following alternative ages: 65, 70, 75, 80, and 85.
3.4.2 Actuarial Assumptions
This research follows the FHA model which uses the female 
mortality tables in the U.S. Decennial Life Tables for 1979- 
8151 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1985),
for all computations, except the taxation of annuities. The
mortality tables stop at age 110; therefore, it is assumed 
that no one survives beyond age 110. The taxation of annuity 
income is based on the annuity tables in the regulations under 
Code section 72*
In keeping with the intent of the FHA model, a move-out 
rate of 3 0 percent of the mortality rate in the Life Tables is 
used. The probability of moving out, conditioned on survival,
51These tables are called Life Tables in this paper.
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is assumed to be independent of mortality. As discussed in 
Section 4.2.2.3, the methodology used in the FHA model (which 
increases mortality each year by 30 percent to cover love- 
outs) is inconsistent with its desired aim.
From the life tables, the following variables are 
significant in this research: life expectancy (LE),
probability of dying (dx) , and probability of moving out (dm) .
Life expectancy is reported in the life tables and in the 
section 72 regulations. Life expectancy as reported in the 
life tables is used to compute the accounting and taxable 
incomes for the financial institution. The section 72 life 
expectancy (which is higher than the life tables) is used to 
compute the homeowner's taxable annuity income under the SI or 
SL plans.
The probability of dying is the cumulative probability of 
dying before a particular age and is used to compute the 
subject's age at death. The formula for the probability of 
dying at a given age is;
nlidXi = — i- (9)
nlIA
where nl is cumulative number living and 
i is the age in question.
The probability of moving is the cumulative probability 
that the subject will move by a certain date, conditioned on 
survival, and is used to compute the subject's age at move-
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out. The formula for the probability of moving out at a given 
age is:
dmi = . 3 dxi. (10)
3*4.3 Death Year
Death year (DY) is the age each subject dies. Using the 
computer's random number generator, each subject is randomly 
given a number (D) between 0 and 1 representing the value of 
dx at the time of the subject's death. Using the life tables
discussed in the preceding section, DY equals the age of the
subject at time D, rounded to the nearest whole year.
3.4.4 Move-out Year
Like Death year, move-out year (MY) is the age each 
subject would move out if still living. Using the computer's 
random number generator, each subject is randomly given a 
number (M) between 0 and 1 representing the value of dm at the 
time the subject moved. MY is the age of the subject at time 
M, rounded to the nearest whole year. The Life Tables produce 
a maximum M of 0.3 at age 110. If M is greater than 0.3, then 
MY is assigned a value of 111. MY is only significant if it 
is less than DY; a move-out on or after a subject's death has 
no meaning.
3.4.5 Interest Rate
The fixed interest rate of 8 (8.5 if insurance is
included) percent per annum compounded monthly is used. A
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variable rate52 was deemed inappropriate because it could 
confound the results of the research. Interest rates are not 
a subject of this study. The addition of a variable rate 
could raise doubts whether the results were due to the 
respective HEC plans and their tax consequences or due to the 
effect of changing interest rates.
3*4.6 FHA Insurance Rate
The FHA insurance rate (FHA) for either the standard HECM 
or the growth HECM is the same as the one fixed by the FHA. 
The rate is 2 percent of the house value at closing plus an 
annual rate of 0.5 percent compounded monthly on the 
outstanding mortgage balance. The insurance rate for the SI 
is computed as if an HECM mortgage were granted at the closing 
instead of an SI. The SL's insurance rate is 2 percent on 
closing and 0.5 percent per annum compounded monthly on the 
insured amount (which is the initial home value increased by 
4 percent per annum).
3*4.7 Closing Costs
Closing costs (CC) are fixed at $2,000 (2 percent of the 
house value) . Although this is at the lower end of costs (see 
HUD 1992) currently charged, it is higher than what other 
research has assumed (see Speare 1992)* The closing costs are 
considered the actual costs incurred by the financial
52As explained in chapter 2, virtually all FHA HECMs are 
variable rate mortgages.
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institution. Therefore, there is no need to separately 
account for these costs for either accounting or taxable 
income purposes.
3.4.8 Home Appreciation Rate
The home appreciation rate (HAR) is treated as a variable 
in this research. In keeping with other studies (see Scholen 
1992) , three alternative rates are used: 0 percent, 4 percent
(the FHA model assumption) and 8 percent per annum. In each 
case the mean appreciation rate for each home is constant. 
One purpose of this research is to learn the effect of the HAR 
on HEC plan choice.
3.4.9 Inflation Rate
For simplicity, the inflation rate (INF) is set at a 
constant 4 percent per annum, the same as the FHA model's 
estimate of HAR.
3*4.10 Discount Rate
The discount rate (DR) is used for computing net present 
value of cash flows and accounting income. The rate used is 
8 percent per annum compounded monthly, the same as INT. In 
short, is assumed that the homeowner, the financial 
institution and the FHA could invest excess funds in 8 percent 
mortgages. Since the discount rate is based on the purchase 
of mortgages, the income from which is taxable, the discount 
rate is deemed to be a pre-tax rate. The discount rate is 
adjusted for taxes, thus
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d r trate = £iVT (1 - TRATE) , (11)
3.4.11 Property Operating Costs
It is assumed that initial operating costs are 3.5 
percent of property value, consisting of 1.8 percent for 
property tax, 1.5 percent for repairs, and 0.2 percent for 
insurance (see Ali et al. 1990) . Costs are adjusted for
changes in the value of the home. Repairs are adjusted for 
changes in inflation, if higher than the home appreciation 
rate.
3*4*12 Plan Servicing Costs
Plan servicing costs are twenty-five dollars per month. 
After adjusting for the interest rate effect and rounding to 
the nearest dollar, the annual charge is 312 dollars. The 
charge is within the range generally charged by financial 
institutions (HUD 1992, p. 3-13). Twenty-five dollars is also 
used by other researchers (see Scholen 1992 and Speare 1992). 
The servicing costs are deemed to cover the costs of servicing 
the plan, with no profit*
3.4.13 Tax Rate
The tax rates (TRATEs) on December 31, 1992 are used.
For individuals, rates of 15 and 28 percent are used. There 
was also a 31 percent rate, but it is not considered because
(1) it is unlikely that an upper income individual would be
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interested in home equity conversion53 and (2) it is not 
materially different from the 28 percent rate. A 34 percent 
rate is used for financial institutions (it is assumed that 
any financial institution interested in home equity conversion 
would be subject to the 34 percent rate).
As part of the president's budget package, tax rates were 
increased effective January 1, 1993* The new 36 percent tax 
rate on individuals only affects individuals with taxable 
income above $115,000 and the 39.6 percent rate applies to 
persons with taxable income over $250,000? upper income 
individuals are unlikely to want home equity conversion. 
Corporations with incomes above $10 million will have a tax 
rate of 35 percent.54 The higher rate is not used in this 
study because (1) not all financial institutions will have the 
threshold income and (2) the difference between 34 and 35 
percent is not material.
3.4.14 Accounting Rules
Accounting rules (AR) are only applicable to the 
financial institution. Except for the depreciation rate on
53The median income of FHA HECM borrowers is less than 
$7,600 of which the median Social Security income is $7,000. 
More than a quarter of borrowers had income of less than 
$3,200, while less than 10 percent had income in excess of 
$15,000. (HUD 1992, p. 2-6).
54Personal service corporations are subject to the 36 
percent tax rate on all income.
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the building (which will be discussed in the next section), 
the rules are discussed in Chapter 2.
3-4.14 Tax Rules
Tax rules (TR) are applicable to homeowners and to 
financial institutions. The tax rules are discussed in 
Chapter 2. As a practical matter, the financial institution 
has no book-tax differences, except that for the SL, 
depreciation for accounting purposes assumes a useful life of 
50 years, while for tax purposes a useful life of 27.5 years 
is used. Since it is impossible to know the exact tax 
position of each homeowner or financial institution, secondary 
effects that depend on facts not included in the study are 
ignored. For example, the effect of added income on the 
taxation of Social Security benefits is ignored* Also, it is 
assumed that the taxpayers are not subject to the alternative 
minimum tax (AMT).
3.4.15 Annua11z at1on
For convenience, all computations in this research are 
done on an annual basis. Each subject is deemed to move out 
or die on either the first or last day of each year. If the 
subject moves out or dies during the last half of the year, 
then the subject is deemed to die at the end of the year. 
Death or move-out within the first half of the year is deemed 
to occur at the beginning of the year. Interest or other 
charges often occur monthly. All rates are converted from
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nominal monthly compounding (Y^ ) to effective annual rates 
(Ye) using the following formula:
r, = (i + 3 f )12- (12>
For example, using the above formula, an 8.3 percent effective 
annual rate is used for all computations assuming 8 percent 
monthly compounding.
3.4•16 Computation of Annuities
Annuities to the homeowner are computed from the above 
assumptions. For the HECM, the monthly payment is determined 
using a computer program furnished by the FHA to FHA lenders. 
This method is necessary because the FHA uses a different 
method for computing the expected life of the loan than is 
used in this research (see Section 3.4.2). The payment is 
annualized using the future value of an annuity formula in the 
footnote to Section 3.2.2 (i.e, the future value of an annuity 
of 12 periods using a nominal interest rate of 8 percent). 
The interest rates used to determine the initial payment of 
the growth mortgage (see section 3.2.2 ) are also adjusted for 
annualization.
Since the annuities in the SI and the SL are paid for 
life, even if the homeowner moves, the annuities are valued 
based on the formula for the present value of an annuity of 
$1.00 per period (PVA$1) over the homeowner's life expectancy 
(LE) :
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r p  1 —— — — — ——
PVA$lk LE - V  ---------=  (l+Jc)^ (13)
K. (1+*)“  k
If the present value of the annuity (PVA) is known, such as 
when property is exchanged for an annuity, the annuity payment 
(AP) is computed as:
PVAk TW , vAPk TF = ---------. (14)
PVA$ lk_LE
If AP is known but PVA is unknown, such as the financial 
institution's annual valuation of the annuity for accounting 
and tax purposes, the PVA can be found with the following 
formula:
PV*k.LB = * APktLB- (I5)
The tax rules use a longer life expectancy (LETT) than
the life expectancy (LE) used to calculate the value of the 
annuities* For tax purposes, the exclusion ratio, ER, (the 
untaxed portion of each payment) is determined using the 
following formula:
AP * LEr , .
E R - - ¥ v i r • (16)
The untaxed amount of each payment is obtained by multiplying 
the amount of the payment (AP) by the exclusion ratio (ER). 
The remaining amount of the payment is subject to tax* The 
taxation of annuity payments is discussed in chapter 2.
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3.5 Model Tests and Hypotheses
The analysis portion of the research is divided into 
three parts. The first part consists of a comparison of the 
four HEC plans for the homeowner, the financial institution, 
and the insurer (FHA) using different age, tax, and house 
appreciation rate assumptions. The second portion tests to 
find if any of the plans are inconsistent with the tax policy 
assumptions discussed in chapter 2 * The last part of the 
analysis is to examine the sensitivity of some of the FHA 
model1s assumptions.
3.5.1 Plan Comparison
As previously stated, the net present value of expected 
returns is the primary measure used to compare the plans. 
Both the expected value and the standard deviation of the 
value are computed for each scenario. A z test is used to 
find if the expected values between two plans are 
significantly different (see Iman and Conover, 283). For 
financial institutions, a similar examination is made for the 
internal rate of return of expected cash flows ("IRR").
Individuals are in a different situation from the 
financial institution and the FHA. First, at least some
individuals may consider using the home equity conversion as 
an investment. Therefore, for individuals, the additional 
choice of doing nothing is analyzed. Secondly, individuals
cannot obtain a portfolio of HECs? consequently, the expected
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value has little significance. For this reason, a test of 
ranks is also used.
For each subject in each scenario, the actual net present 
value is computed for each HEC plan (including doing nothing) . 
The net present value of each plan is ranked, so that each 
plan has a value between 1 (best) and 5 (worst)? ties were 
averaged (there are ties between two plans, but no ties 
between three or more plans)* The ranks are analyzed in three 
ways. The first is an overall test of expected ranks (instead 
of expected NPV). The second are two overall mini-max tests 
to determine the number of times a plan is the best (or best 
two) or the worst (or worst two), with 0.5 points awarded for 
ties. The computer program that analyzes ranks also collects 
data for a head to head test between each plan, with ties 
being ignored.
For testing purposes, the test of expected ranks is 
analyzed using the same methodology described in the first 
paragraph of this section. The other tests use a binomial 
distribution. For test two, a significant (p =.05) likelihood 
of having at least a 50 percent chance of being in the best or 
worst categories is deemed significant. The likelihood of not 
being in the best or worst categories is also tested. The 
head to head data is tested only for doing nothing, since 
comparison between the other plans is not particularly
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interesting* The head-to-head test assumes an expected rate 
of 50 percent.
3.5.2 Tax Policy Assumptions
As stated in section 2*3.2, there are two tax policy 
issues relating to home equity conversion that are tested in 
this research. The first issue is vertical equity. Vertical 
equity seeks to have taxpayers with more income pay more tax 
than persons with less income. A vertical equity problem is 
indicated if a person makes an investment decision such that 
the decision is different given different tax rates. A tax 
exempt bond is an example of a vertical equity violation.
Persons in high tax brackets find the bonds more profitable 
than competing investments, while lower taxed persons do not. 
Therefore, in this research, a change in an investment 
decision based on changes in the tax rate is treated as a 
surrogate for a violation of the vertical equity 
principle.55 This idea can be expressed in the following 
research hypothesis:
Hr Ceteris paribus, if choice A has a greater expected 
NPV than choice B before tax then choice A has an
equal or greater expected NPV than choice B after
taxes, using a tax adjusted discount rate.
55As hinted by the example of tax exempt bonds, the tax 
law has many violations of the vertical equity principle. 
However, from a policy standpoint, it is necessary that 
Congress be aware of the violations.
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In its broadest sense, a tax subsidy exists where the tax 
law provides a benefit for a particular transaction not 
available for other transactions. Therefore, in this sense, 
the vertical equity issue and the tax subsidy are the same. 
However, "tax subsidy" is often given a more narrow 
definition* Under this definition, and the definition used in 
this research, a person receives a tax subsidy if the expected 
return after tax is greater than the expected return before 
tax. Some tax shelters before 1986 were set up as tax 
subsidies. The out of pocket costs of the tax shelters were 
more than offset by current tax savings from the investments. 
Although taxes would ultimately be due, the gain would be 
taxed at a lower rate than the initial deductions and gain 
would not be taxed for several years, reducing the present 
value of the tax due. This definition leads to the following 
research hypothesis for a tax subsidy:
Hr Ceteris paribus, the before-tax NPV from choice A 
is less than the after-tax NPV of choice A after 
tax, where the after-tax discount rate is not 
adjusted for the tax rate.
3.5*3 Sensitivity of FHA Assumptions
Although the assumptions of the FHA model appear 
consistent with the assumptions used by other organizations in 
establishing their plans (see Chapter 2 for the model
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assumptions of other plans), the FHA plan has been criticized 
for having assumptions that are too liberal.
Toward a better understanding of the risks inherent in 
the FHA1s plan, this research explores the sensitivity of the 
assumptions in the FHA model. The base model employs the same 
model as used for evaluating the profitability of the FHA plan 
as discussed in this chapter, except for the sales price of 
the home. The sales price is deemed to be 100 percent of fair 
market value instead of 90 percent of fair market value, A 
fixed initial age of 75 is used as it is close to the 76.7 
median age of FHA HECM borrowers (HUD 1993, p. 2-3).56 
Specifically, the following assumptions are examined: (1) the
discount rate (i.e., the assumed rate of return on assets),
(2) the move-out rate (as a percentage of mortality), (3) the 
house sales price (as a percentage of market value), (4) the 
average house appreciation rate, and (5) the standard 
deviation of the house appreciation rate (assuming the average 
house appreciation rate is 4 percent per year).
The FHA break-even point is computed using the same 
sample of 1000 subjects as is used for comparisons between 
plans. Variances across samples are not examined. The 
variance of a sample mean decreases in proportion to the
56The use of a lower age than the median age can be 
considered conservative. The results of this research suggest 
that the FHA earns a higher return from older borrowers than 
younger borrowers.
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number in the sample. For instance, for samples of one 
thousand loans, the variance of the mean return is 0.1 
percent of the variance of an individual return.57 For 
items 1 to 4, the break-even point is computed to the nearest 
reasonable interval (e.g., within one-tenth of a percent for 
the home appreciation rate). For item 5, NPV1s are computed 
for rates of return varying from -4 percent to 8 percent.
Given these outcomes, the standard deviation producing a 
zero NPV about a mean of 4 percent (assuming returns are 
normally distributed) is computed using a trial and error 
procedure. The method of computing standard deviation of 
returns is that used by Speare (1992) instead of that used by 
Szymanoski (1990) in developing the FHA model. The difference 
is explained in chapter 2.
57The standard deviation of the sample's mean return is 
about 3.2 percent of the standard deviation of an individual 
return.
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part 
summarizes the results of the simulation described in chapter 
3. It compares the four HEC plans from the prospective of the 
homeowner, the financial institution, and the insurer (FHA) 
under different age, tax, and house appreciation rate 
assumptions. The second part examines the results of the 
simulations with respect to consistency with tax policy 
assumptions. The final part of the analysis examines the 
sensitivity of some of the FHA model assumptions.
4.1 Plan Comparison
The main purpose of this study is to evaluate the need 
for the FHA to insure additional forms of home equity 
conversion ("HEC"), namely a growth mortgage ("GR"), a split 
interest plan ("SI"), and a sale-leaseback ("SL"). The 
assumption is made that a HEC plan will not be successful 
unless it produces satisfactory results to the homeowner, the 
financial institution, and the FHA. In general, the net 
present value of cash flow is used to measure the results, but 
other measures are used as well. In determining net present 
value, it is assumed that each person or entity can invest
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surplus funds in similar mortgages, thereby producing a 
discount rate of 8*3 percent annually (equivalent to 8% 
compounded monthly) before tax. For taxpayers subject to tax, 
the discount rate is reduced by the tax on the interest 
earned. For example, for an individual in the 15% tax 
bracket, the discount rate is 7.055 percent (8.3 percent less 
15% of 8.3%).
4.1.1 Homeowner
Unlike a financial institution or the FHA, the homeowner 
is not in a position to form a portfolio of HEC instruments 
that is likely to average the expected cash flow from the 
instrument over time. The homeowner has only one opportunity 
to enter into a HEC plan. Therefore, the homeowner's review 
process is likely to be different from that of the financial 
institution or the FHA. For that reason, different 
performance measures are used to evaluate the HEC plans for 
the homeowner.
Among the least sophisticated but possibly the most 
important selection criterion for many homeowners is the 
initial annual payment to be received under each plan. Table 
258 shows the initial payment received under each plan for 
each age* The initial payment for the SL is reduced by the
58For all tables, each of the plans is abbreviated as 
follows (abbreviation in parentheses): do nothing (NO) ?
standard HECM mortgage (FH); growth HECM mortgage (GR)? split 
interest (SI); and sale-leaseback (SL).
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interest (including FHA insurance), since it must be 
immediately repaid to the financial institution as rent. Note 
that up to age 75, the standard HECM mortgage ("FH") produces 
the highest initial payment. Somewhere between age 75 and 80, 
the SI and SL produce higher initial payments, with the SI 
being the higher. Since the FH model contains a 4 percent 
growth factor for the house (which is not part of the SI 
model), one would assume that the FH should produce a higher 
initial payment. However, the FH model also includes an 
assumption that all homeowners live to age 100, whereas the SI 
and SL models use actual life expectancy (which is 8.69 years 
at age 80) . The differences in assumed life expectancy 
eventually lead SI and SL to have higher payments at about age 
80.
A more sophisticated method of analyzing the results to 
the homeowner is to examine the net present value ("NPV") of 
expected cash flow59 based on the homeowner's age, tax rate, 
and expected appreciation rate of the home. In this study, 
the expected cash flow is the expected cash flow of home 
ownership. Since home ownership is an expense, expected cash 
flows are all negative. Table 3 (with parts A, B, and C) 
shows the homeowner's expected cash flow and its standard 
deviation at each age, tax rate, and appreciation rate. Since
59Unless clearly indicated otherwise the term "expected 
cash flow" refers to the NPV of expected cash flow.
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some homeowners may choose not to borrow, an additional choice 
of doing nothing ("NO") is added to the analysis.
Except where the appreciation rate is zero, NO results in 
the highest expected value. Depending on the home 
appreciation rate, either the FH or the GR tends to have the 
second highest expected value. The FH has higher expected 
values than the GR for home appreciation rates less than 4 
percent and lower expected values for home appreciation rates 
greater than 4 percent. Although the FH's expected value is 
slightly higher than the GR1 s where the home appreciation rate 
equals 4 percent, the differences are generally not 
significant. The SI consistently has the lowest expected 
values at all ages, appreciation rates, and tax rates. The SL 
did better than expected; since the SI receives better tax 
treatment than the SL, it was expected that the SL would have 
the lowest expected cash flow.
As indicated by the high standard deviations of the 
expected cash flow, expected cash flow may be unimportant to 
the homeowner. Another way to analyze expected cash flow is 
to use expected cash flow rank. The methodology used is 
discussed in section 3.4.1. Table 4 (with parts A, B, and C) 
shows the expected cash flow rank for each HEC choice, age, 
tax rate, and house appreciation rate (1 represents the 
highest expected cash flow). The use of ranks generally 
results in the same ordering as the use of expected cash flow.
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The primary difference is that the SI generally has a higher 
rank than the SL, although it has a lower expected cash flow. 
The apparent reason for this is that the SL probably has a 
greater skewness and may have had its expected cash flow 
increased by a few events. Likewise, the GR in some 
situations has a higher expected rank than the FH, even though 
the FH has a higher expected value.
Instead of using rank order comparisons, a homeowner may 
wish to choose among the plans using probability of achieving 
the highest expected cash flow (maxi-max type of analysis) or 
the probability of not generating the lowest expected cash 
flow (min-min type of analysis) . Table 5 (with parts A, B, 
and C) presents the maxi-max type of analysis and Table 6 
(with parts A, B, and C) presents the mini-min type of 
analysis. Since NO may not be a choice for some homeowners, 
the tables also show whether a plan is among the highest or 
lowest two expected values.
The results are generally consistent with the analysis of 
ranks. NO is clearly the best choice for almost all homeowners 
using maxi-max type of analysis. The GR consistently (with a 
few exceptions) gives the best mini-min results. Although the 
FH is more likely than the GR to have the highest expected 
value, the GR is more likely to have one of the two highest 
expected values. This suggests that conservative homeowners 
may prefer the GR, even if it is less likely to result in the
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highest expected value. The SI and SL consistently have the 
lowest probability of having the highest return and the 
highest probability of the lowest return (SI is worst for 
those over 75 and SL is worst for those under 80).
4.1.1.1 Age Effect
As discussed in the previous section, the relative ranks 
of the HEC plans are largely unaffected by the homeowner's 
initial age. Due to the lower variance of life expectancy and 
reduced effects of compounding, differences in expected values 
and ranks tend to converge with increases in age. As in the 
overall analysis, NO tends to have the highest expected rank 
at all ages. Of the HEC plans, the GR tends to have the
highest expected rank at all ages. The SI and SL consistently
provide the two lowest NPVs of cash flows, with the SL being 
the worst at lower ages and the SI being the worst at higher 
ages. Contrast this with the size of initial payments (Table 
2), indicating that comparisons of initial payments may
mislead elderly homeowners.
Table 7 provides a convenient mechanism for displaying 
these rank relationships* It averages the ranks for each 
initial age without regard to tax rate or home appreciation 
rate*60 The table confirms that NO is generally the
60A limitation of this methodology is that it assumes an 
equal likelihood of each tax rate and home appreciation rate. 
Similar limitations apply to Tables 8 and 9, discussed in the 
next two sections.
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preferred choice at any age. Of the HEC plans, the GR shows 
the lowest expected rank at all ages, except for age 65* 
Although the FH shows a higher expected rank at age 65, the 
difference between it and the GR is not statistically 
significant. The table shows that the expected ranks of NO or 
using the FH tend to get worse as the initial age increases. 
On the other hand, the expected ranks of the GR, the SI and 
the SL tend to improve as the initial age increases. Although 
the SL tends to have a lower incidence of the worst returns at 
higher ages than the SI, the SI has a superior expected rank 
for all age groups (although the margin narrows as initial age 
increases).
An examination of the times that NO had the highest or 
lowest returns to the homeowner shows that NO consistently 
(i.e., over 90 percent of the time) had either the highest or 
lowest returns where home appreciation rates were at least 4 
percent* From this, it can be concluded that doing nothing 
results in a higher expected cash flow unless the homeowner 
greatly outlives the life expectancy. The number of times (in 
one thousand simulations) that doing nothing leads to the best 
result can be interpreted as the percentage of homeowners of 
the same age that the homeowner must out-live to increase NPV 
(i.e., to profit) by using home equity conversion. An 
interesting characteristic of this number is that the 
percentage decreases with initial age. Assuming a zero tax
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rate and 4 percent home appreciation, a 65 year old homeowner 
must outlive 79*7 percent of homeowners of the same age to 
profit by using home equity conversion, but a 85 year old 
homeowner only needs to outlive 63.1 percent of homeowners of 
the same age. Where the home appreciation rate is zero, there 
is less likelihood that NO will be at the extremes 
(particularly at younger ages) and the likelihood of having 
the best result increases with initial age. However, the 
expected rank of NO (see Table 4A) tends to decrease as the 
initial age increases. These results suggest that initial age 
is an important variable in determining the relative cost of 
home equity conversion to the homeowner.
4.1.1.2 Tax Effect
The relative tax advantage of any plan can best be 
examined by analyzing ranks (Table 4) and to a lesser extent 
the likelihood of the highest (Table 5) and lowest (Table 6) 
ranks. Table 8 summarizes parts A, B, and C of Table 4 by 
showing the expected rank of each plan without regard to 
initial age or home appreciation rate. A plan can be 
considered relatively favorably taxed if the plan consistently 
improves its rank, increases its likelihood of the highest 
ranks and decreases its likelihood of the lowest ranks as 
taxes are increased for a given age and appreciation rate. On 
the other hand, if the opposite is true, then the plan can be
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considered relatively unfavorably taxed in comparison with the 
other choices.
NO not only tends to have the best outcomes for all ages 
and for most appreciation rates, but the relative advantage of 
NO (in relation to the other plans) consistently increases 
with the homeowner's marginal tax rate. This shows that none 
of the HEC plans offer the homeowner an effective tax shelter. 
Table 8 also shows that although the expected rank of each 
HECM changes with tax rates, the order of the rankings between 
instruments is not affected by the tax rate. This clearly 
shows that the tax effect is not significant to the homeowner.
Table 8 shows an unexpected outcome of this study. While 
the expected rank of SI is higher than that of SL for all tax 
brackets, the difference between their respective ranks 
decreases as the tax rate increases. Since the SL has 
particularly unfavorable tax consequences to the homeowner, 
the differences would be expected to increase.
4.1.1.3 Home Appreciation Rate Effect
The home appreciation rate effect also can be seen from 
the ranks of the alternative vehicles (Table 4) and from the 
likelihood of having the best (Table 5) and worst results 
(Table 6) . Table 9 summarizes parts A, B, and C of Table 4 by 
providing the average rank of each vehicle for each home 
appreciation rate without regard to the homeowner's initial 
age or tax rate.
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From the tables it is evident that the SI and SL plans 
display their best relative performance at 4 percent 
appreciation, the model assumption, and tend to get more 
disadvantageous as appreciation deviates above or below this 
rate. If appreciation rates fall below 4 percent, mortgage 
plans are at a relative advantage to the homeowner because the 
mortgage plans assume a 4 percent growth while the homeowner 
does not have a 4 percent increase in housing costs. As 
appreciation rates increase above 4 percent, the added 
appreciation goes to the financial institution. The 
appreciation in the home value more than offsets the increase 
in housing expenses (i.e., repairs, insurance, and taxes) paid 
by the financial institution.
The relative advantage of NO increases as home 
appreciation rates increase. Where the home appreciation rate 
is less than 4 percent, the mortgage choices have a relative 
advantage to the homeowner because mortgage annuity payments 
are predicated on a 4 percent rate of appreciation. As the 
appreciation rate increases, the mortgage balance is less 
likely to exceed the mortgage balance (a major advantage of 
the mortgage option) and is therefore less likely to produce 
a windfall to the homeowner*
Table 9 shows that although the ranks of the five choices 
vary with different appreciation rates, the order of the ranks 
between choices remains the same. This suggests that the
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homeowner's choice should be independent of the expected home 
appreciation rate. Of particular significance to the insurer, 
the table shows that doing nothing tends to have the best 
overall rank even assuming zero appreciation. Table 10 gives 
further evidence that this adverse selection problem is small. 
Assuming zero appreciation, doing nothing is more likely to 
yield a higher NPV than any HEC plan at any age or tax rate, 
except that the FH is more likely to have a higher NPV at age 
65 or 70 in the zero tax bracket and at age 65 in the 15 
percent tax bracket* The likelihood of any of the exceptions 
does not exceed 60 percent.61 
4.1.1.4 Summary
With few exceptions most homeowners expect to be better 
off by NO than by using home equity conversion, suggesting 
that a need for additional cash flow should be the most 
important criterion for deciding whether to use home equity 
conversion. If home equity conversion is needed, the GR tends 
to have the highest likelihood of producing a superior NPV, 
except for certain persons at lower ages where the FH tends to 
have the highest likelihood. However, even for those persons, 
the advantage tends to be small. The superior NPV of the GR 
must be tempered by its low initial payment, which may be too
61This indicates that the homeowner is unlikely to, use 
home equity conversion as an investment device. It does not 
address the possibility that homeowners who need home equity 
conversion may be more likely to live in deteriorating 
neighborhoods.
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low to benefit some homeowners. Neither the SI nor the SL is 
a favorable choice for the homeowner if NPV is used as a 
criterion.
4.1.2 Financial Institution
Unlike the homeowner, the financial institution may (and 
is expected to) invest in a portfolio of HEC instruments. 
This creates two major differences in the analysis of the 
financial institution. First, the expected NPV of cash flow 
is far more significant to the financial institution. 
Secondly, rather than comparing the HEC vehicles to each 
other, they can be analyzed individually. That is, each 
vehicle can be examined independently to find if its expected 
NPV is such that an investment is prudent.
Table 11 (with parts A, B, and C) shows the expected NPV 
of cash flows for each vehicle, broken down by expected 
appreciation, initial age, and tax rate. Note that, as 
expected, the mortgage options result in a NPV and standard 
deviation of zero? i.e., the mortgages produce a certain 
return equal to the discount rate. Both the SI and the SL 
always result in a positive NPV to the financial institution* 
However, the standard deviation of the NPVs is very high, 
indicating a need for a large portfolio to reduce risk. The 
high standard deviations suggest that the financial 
institutions may be unwilling to make these vehicles more 
attractive to the homeowner. Even if the financial
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institutions were willing to do this, the expected NPVs to the 
homeowner usually would still be worse than the mortgage plans 
(i.e., the combined NPVs of the homeowner (Table 3) and the 
financial institution (Table 11) are less favorable than the 
mortgage plans).
Table 12 (with parts A, B, and C) shows the internal rate 
of return ("IRR") of expected cash flows to the financial 
institution of each plan. This was developed by averaging the 
cash flows for all one thousand subjects by year and computing 
the IRR using the average cash flows. IRRs over 100 percent 
are not considered meaningful. As expected, the two mortgage 
plans have an IRR of 8.3 percent before tax and 5.478 (rounded 
in the table) percent after tax, the same as the discount rate 
used.
The IRRs of the SI and SL plans are extremely high, 
especially at advanced initial ages. Although the expected 
NPV decreases with age, the IRR increases. This is due, in 
part, to the extremely high leverage used in the these two 
plans. At the initial age of 85, the income generated by the 
death of the homeowners is sufficient to cover the expected 
cash outflow from annuity payments and costs, even in the 
first years of the plan.
Table 11 shows that taxes do not play a material role in 
the financial institution's decision to invest in a particular 
plan. The NPVs of the mortgage plans are zero whatever the
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tax rate. The SI and SL plans have higher after-tax NPV's for 
ages 65 and 70, but lower after-tax NPV*s starting at age 75. 
Table 12 adds additional evidence of this? post-tax IRRs are 
consistently lower than pre-tax IRRs.
As with the other variables discussed above, the home 
appreciation rate does not affect the financial institution's 
return from the mortgage plans. Since the SI and SL give the 
benefit of additional appreciation to the financial 
institution, the financial institution generally has a higher 
expected NPV (Table 10) and IRR of expected NPV (Table 11) as 
the appreciation rate of the home increases. Due to lower 
property taxes and insurance costs, zero appreciation yields 
a better return than 4 percent appreciation at initial age 65.
For accounting policy, a major concern is whether adverse 
accounting rules may discourage the use of the SI or SL. The 
adverse accounting rules are most pronounced for the SI, under 
which the financial institution would report income only in 
the year the house was sold or the year the homeowner died 
(forfeiting the remaining annuity value). The financial 
institution shows a loss for all other years. Table 13 (with 
parts A, B, and C) shows the NPV of accounting flows of each 
plan. As demonstrated by the table, the expected NPVs for all 
plans are positive. The expected NPVs of the SI and SL always 
exceed that of the GR and, except for ages below 75 or at a 
zero home appreciation rate, exceed that of the FH. Clearly,
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given a portfolio of investments, the adverse effects are 
largely averaged away. In fact, a year-by-year analysis 
indicates that the expected, accounting income tends to be
positive for all but a few years, even at initial age 65.
4.1.3 The FHA
Table 14 shows the NPV of the FHA expected cash flows
from insuring each of the four plans. The minimum return on 
investment (IRR) needed for the FHA to break-even (Table 15) 
provides some additional information. Since the insured 
amount under the SI is the same as the FH, the values for the 
two plans are the same. At 8 percent appreciation, the FHA 
has positive expected cash flow for each year under all plans. 
Since negative returns are unlikely, for convenience, the 
table reports the minimum return as zero.
Assuming a house appreciation rate of 4 percent, Table 15 
shows that the FHA should break-even under its current plan? 
expected cash flow is significantly different from zero only 
at age 80. At that appreciation rate, the IRR needed to 
break-even varies from 7.28 to 8.60 percent. At that rate, 
the break-even rate for the GR is lower, ranging from 4.17 to 
5.29 percent. This lower rate is due to the way the GR is 
organized. The balance due on the GR is lower than the 
mortgage balance on the FH until age 100. The higher NPVs of 
the GR for growth rates of zero and 4 percent are consistent 
with IRRs. At an 8 percent home appreciation rate, the FH has
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a higher NPV than the GR, because more premiums are collected 
and no claims are paid.
An examination of the SL suggests that the plan presented 
is adverse to the FHA. At a zero home appreciation rate, the 
FHA's NPV of expected losses is more than triple that of any 
other plan. At 4 percent appreciation, rather than breaking- 
even, the plan shows a significant profit for an initial age 
of 65, while showing significant losses for initial ages of 75 
and over. Although the NPV of expected cash flows is higher 
than any other plan if the home appreciation rate is 8 
percent, it is probably not enough to offset the negative 
results at lower appreciation rates.
4.2 Tax Policy Questions
This section addresses two important issues. The first 
is the concept of vertical equity (i.e., higher income 
taxpayers pay more taxes)* The second is the existence of a 
tax subsidy (i.e., it is more profitable to pay taxes than not 
pay taxes). The discussion in Section 4.1 foreshadows the 
examination of to these two issues. Since tax is not a 
significant factor for either the homeowner or the financial 
institution, there is not likely to be a problem with either 
issue.
Section 4.1.1.2, noted that the ranking of plans to the 
homeowner is not affected by tax rates. A study of Table 3 
suggests that the choice between plans using NPV is also not
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affected by tax rates, except in a few instances where the 
differences between the NPV's of the two plans are small. All 
these instances involved a choice between the FH and the GR, 
which are not actually different from a tax standpoint. In 
Table 11, the ranking of NPVs of each plan for any given age 
and home appreciation rate is the same before- and after-tax. 
This shows that the tax system does not favor one plan over 
another*
The second question is closely related to the findings in 
Section 4.1.1.2. The results show that most homeowners would 
be better off doing nothing than using any form of HEC. The 
second question raises a different issue: Is there a negative
effective tax rate on expected cash flows for any plan? To 
evaluate this, the NPV of expected cash flows was examined for 
both the homeowner and financial institution at all possible 
tax rates (0, 15 and 28 percent for the homeowner and 0 and 34 
percent for the financial institution). A discount rate of
8.3 percent was used regardless of tax rate. The expected 
NPV of cash flows for a higher tax rate is always lower than 
that for a lower tax rate (given the same initial age and home 
appreciation rate). Therefore, the hypothesis that there is 
a tax subsidy cannot be supported.
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4 * 3 Sensitivity of the FHA Model
The simulation used to test the sensitivity of the FHA 
model resulted in a base expected net present value of $1,200 
with a standard deviation of $5,077. Considering the number 
of simulations (1,000), the standard deviation of the sample 
mean is $161. The confidence intervals for testing the 
equality of the means in subsequent tests are $316 at the 95 
percent confidence level and $415 at the 99 percent confidence 
level.62 The tests each have 1,000 data points and assume 
a two tailed test.
The base analysis shows that the minimum expected 
discount rate to break-even is 5.79 percent. The expected 
values are not significantly different from zero (p = .05) for 
interest rates ranging from about 5.4 percent to 6.3 percent 
(see Table 16) . The differences in expected value with 
increasing discount rates (in Table 16) show that the 
differences decrease as interest rates increase.
The move-out rate does not appear to be a significant 
factor for the FHA. As shown by Table 17, assuming no move- 
outs, the FHA would expect a net present value of cash flows 
of $728, which is significantly different from zero (p = .01).
62These confidence intervals are used for all tests of 
the FHA assumptions. In computing changes in the mean value 
of expected return with changes in the values of the 
assumptions, changes in the standard deviation of the returns 
were not computed. It is possible that confidence levels for 
different changes in assumptions may differ from these levels. 
However, the changes are likely to be small.
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The table also shows that a five percentage point change in 
the move-out rate seldom made a difference exceeding $100. 
This suggests that differences in expected move-out rates of 
15 percent cannot be said to be statistically different 
(p = . 05) .
As demonstrated by Table 18, the effect of the sales 
price as a percent of fair market value by itself is not an 
important variable. The net present value is not 
significantly different from zero (p = .05) if the sales price 
discount is between 10 and 14 percent.63 Discounts greater 
than 14 percent are probably unusual.
The expected home appreciation rate is a major component 
of the FHA model. As demonstrated by Table 19, FHA's risk of 
overestimating the home appreciation rate is great. The mean 
rate64 for breaking even is 3.3 percent. Rates of 3.2 to 
3.4 percent are not statistically different (p = .05) from 
zero, a narrow range. The table also shows that most of the 
profits resulting from appreciation rates higher than assumed 
by the model primarily benefit the homeowner.. For example, 
appreciation in excess 7 percent only benefits the homeowner.
This relationship demonstrates the importance of the 
variance of the mean appreciation rate between homes. Table
63The methodology of this research considers the discount 
a fixed variable, no analysis is performed as to the effect of 
variance*
64This assumes all homes appreciate at the same rate.
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20 shows that if the mean home appreciation rate is 4 percent, 
the expected net present value would be approximately zero if 
the standard deviation of returns between homes is 2.8 
percent. A standard deviation of between 2.2 percent and 3.4 
percent is not statistically different (p = .05) from zero. 
Assuming a mean 4 percent appreciation rate and using the 2.2 
standard deviation, the FHA could expect to break even if 
about two-thirds of the homes have an appreciation rate 
between 1.8 percent and 6.2 percent and less than one-sixth of 
the homes have an appreciation rate of less than 1.2 percent. 
It appears that the range is reasonable.
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TABLE 2
HOMEOWNER'S INITIAL ANNUAL PAYMENT 
(in dollars)
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TABLE 3A
HOMEOWNER'S NPV OF EXPECTED CASH FLOW
ZERO APPRECIATION
(in dollars)
# Lowest expected NPV (p —  . 0 5 )
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TABLE 3B
HOMEOWNER'S NPV OF EXPECTED CASH FLOW
4% APPRECIATION
(in dollars)
INITIAL AGE
65 70 75 80 85
-81,929* -66,370* -43,738* -43,738*
(32 ,522) (31,190) (29,166) (26 ,272) (22 ,871)
z
t:
FH
-95,317
(30 ,058)
-83,326
(28,799)
-70,546
(26,810)
-58,193
(23,920)
-45,933
(16 ,226)
R
0
I
GR
-97,638
(32,550)
-84,992
(31,046)
-71,945
(28,716}
-59,159
(25 ,414)
-47,912 
(21 .121)
A
X 51 -115,652 -105,404* -93 ,318* -78,973* -65,920*
(6,230) (4 ,686) (5 ,510) (11,590) (20,219)
SL
-115,300
(15 ,605)
-104,137 
(15,694)
-91,274
(16,639)
-76,425
(20,122)
-63,134
(26 ,714)
i
NO
-86,788* 
(32 ,881)
--74,221
(30,732)
-61.811*
(28 .123) ( 2 4 ,8u4j
-40,219*
(21 ,200)
5
P FH
-95,625
(32,665)
-82,258 
(30,568)
-68,907
(27,749)
-56,200
(24,178)
-45,200
(19 ,727)
R
C
L
N
T
T
GR
-97,204
(35 ,232)
-83,519
(32 ,806)
-69,880
(29,588)
-■56,899
(25,573)
-45,736
(20 ,738)
SI
--122,666
(9 ,935)
-111,547*
(7,166)
-98,328*
(3 ,427)
-82 ,4 41 1 
(5 ,132 )
-67,946*
(14 ,482)
H
X
SL
-122,183
(20,164)
-108.797
(18,939)
-93,9124
(17,816)
-77,413 
(18,124)
-62,860
(22,240)
NO
-81,929*
(32,711)
-69 ,245*
(29,913)
*
-57,123 -45,960
(23,116)
-42,491*
(20 ,994)
8
f -95,877 -81,302 -67,245 -54,248 -43,285
P
c
H (36,508) (32,394) (28,652) (24,374) (19 ,406)
R
r -96,637 -81,954 -66,768
-54,658 -93,632
E
ViR
(38,083) (34,580) (30 ,402) (25,699) (20 ,331)
N
T -1 3 1 .52 7 ' -1 18,746* -104,082* -86,418* -70,365*
I
Si
(21 ,118) (17,383) ....AXhmi... . (7 ,333 ) (9 ,896 )
A
V
SL
-129,465 
(25 ,901)
-113,764 
(23,799)
-96,352
L . ( . ? 1 ’0 6 6 ) _
-/is, 745 
(18 ,408)
-62,998 
j (19 ,235)
ytandarc; deviation is in parentheses.
* Highest expected NPV (p = .05)
* Lowest expected NPV (p = .05)
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TABLE 3C
HOMEOWNER'S NPV OF EXPECTED CASH FLOW
8% APPRECIATION
(in dollars)
* Highest expected NPV (p = .05)
# Lowest expected NPV (p = .05)
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TABLE 4A
HOMEOWNER'S NPV OF EXPECTED CASH FLOW RANK 
ZERO APPRECIATION
INITIAL AGE
Differences between ranks of more than .10 and .15 are significant at the .05
and the .01 levels of significance respectively.
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TABLE 4B
HOMEOWNER1S NPV OF EXPECTED CASH FLOW RANK 
4% APPRECIATION
Differences between ranks of more than .10 and .15 are significant at the .05
and the .01 levels of significance respectively.
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TABLE 4C
HOMEOWNER1S NPV OF EXPECTED CASH FLOW RANK 
8% APPRECIATION
Differences between ranks of more than .10 and .15 are significant at the .05
and the .01 levels of significance respectively.
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TABLE 5A
TIMES PLAN HAD HIGHEST TWO NPVs TO HOMEOWNER
ZERO APPRECIATION
* Probability of highest (or highest 2) NPV(s) > 50% (P -.05)* * Probability of highest (or highest 2) NPV(s) > 75% (P -.05)* * * Probability of highest (or highest 2) NPV(s) > 90% (P -.05)1 Probability of highest (or highest 2) NPV(a) < 10% (P -.05)## Probability of highest (or highest 2) NPV(s) < 5% (P -.05)
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TABLE 5B
TIMES PLAN HAD HIGHEST TWO NPVs TO HOMEOWNER
4% APPRECIATION
* Probability of highest (or highest 2) NPV(s) > 50% (p -.05).
** Probability of highest (or highest 2) NPV(s) > 75% (p -.05).
*** Probability of highest (or highest 2) NPV(s) > 90% (p -.05).
• Probability of highest (or highest 2) NPV(s) < 10% (p -.05).
## Probability of highest (or highest 2) NPV(s) < 5% (p -.05).
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TABLE 5C
TIMES PLAN HAD HIGHEST TWO NPVs TO HOMEOWNER
8% APPRECIATION
Probability of highest. (or highest 2) NPV(3) > 50% (P -.05)
Probability of highest V highest 2) NPV{3) > 75% (P -.05)
Probability of highest (or highest 2) NPV{3) > 90% (P -.05)
Probability of highest (or highest 2) NPV(s) < 10% (P -.05)
Probability of highest (or highest 2) NPV(s) < 5% (P -.05)
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TABLE 6A
TIMES PLAN HAD LOWEST TWO NPVs TO HOMEOWNER
ZERO APPRECIATION
* Probability of lowest (or lowest 2) HPV(s) > 50% (p -.05).
** Probability of lowest (or lowest 2) NPV(s) > 75% (p -.05).
*** Probability of lowest (or lowest 2) NPV(a) > 90% (p -.05).
* Probability of lowest (or lowest 2 ) NPV(s) < 10% (p «.05).
## Probability of lowest (or lowest 2) NPV(s) < 5% (p -.05).
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TABLE 6B
TIMES PLAN HAD LOWEST TWO NPVs TO HOMEOWNER
4% APPRECIATION
* Probability of lowest for lowest 2) NPV(s) > 50% (p -.05).
** Probability of lowest (or lowest 2) NPV(s) > 75% (p *.05).
*** Probability of lowest (or lowest 2) NPV(s) > 90% (p -.05).
* Probability of lowest (or lowest 2) NPV(s) < 10% (p -.05).
## Probability of lowest (or lowest 2) NPV(s) < 5% (p -.05).
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TABLE 6C
TIMES PLAN HAD LOWEST TWO NPVs TO HOMEOWNER
8% APPRECIATION
* Probability of lowest (or lowest 2) NPV(s) > 50% (P “-05)** Probability of lowest (or lowest 2) NPV(s) > 75% (P “‘05)*** Probability of lowest (or lowest 2) NPV(s) > 90% (P --05)
§ Probability of lowest (or lowest 2) NPV(s) < 10% (P -.05)## Probability of lowest {or lowest 2) NPV(s) < 5% (P --05)
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HOMEOWNER'S EXPECTED RANK BY AGE 
(without regard to tax or home appreciation rates)
TABLE 7
Differences of .05 are significant at p =.05. 
Differences of .09 are significant at p =.01.
TABLE 8
HOMEOWNER'S EXPECTED RANK BY TAX RATE 
(without regard to initial age or home appreciation rate)
TAX RATE
ZERO 15
PERCENT
28 !
PERCENT
NO 1.90 1, 61
i1.. 4 4
FH 2.81 2 . 7 6 2 . 67
2.28 jGR 2 . 26 2 . 3 0
SI 3.73 4.08
“I
4 * 22
1 SL I 4.30 | 4.25 4 . 39
Differences of .05 are significant at p =.05. 
Differences of .06 are significant at p =.01.
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HOMEOWNER1S EXPECTED RANK BY HOME APPRECIATION RATE 
(without regard to initial age or tax rate)
TABLE 9
Differences of .05 are significant at p =.05. 
Differences of .06 are significant at p =.01.
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TABLE 10
TIMES HOMEOWNER1S NPV EXCEEDS DOING NOTHING 
ZERO APPRECIATION
INITIAL AGE
; SV V ?r;x li-SLfi; -I 333 .
5 21 *
'
75 
418
8 0 
371
85
376FH 583*
GR 420 4 0 0 34 3 371 376
SI 16 142 3 0 9 371 3 7 6
SL 16 93 271 371 376
FH
GP
5 3 2 * 463 4 06 36 0 32 0
37 0 343 293 276 321
SI 10 41 160 27 6 321
321SL 10 24 91 324
FH 496 426 364 311 26 9
GR 54 5 3 08 2 7 6 224 230
SI 8 20 6 5 193 26 9
SL 8 17 34 120 | 230
* Probability that plan's NPV is greater than doing nothing > 50% (p =.05).
** Probability that plan's NPV is greater than doing nothing > 75% (p =.05)
*** Probability that plan's NPV is greater than doing nothing > 90% (p =.05).
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TABLE 11A
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION'S NPV OF EXPECTED CASH FLOW
ZERO APPRECIATION
(in dollars)
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TABLE 11B
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION'S EXPECTED CASH FLOW
4% APPRECIATION
(in dollars)
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TABLE 11C
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION'S NPV OF EXPECTED CASH FLOW
8% APPRECIATION
(in dollars)
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TABLE 11C
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION'S NPV OF EXPECTED CASH FLOW
8% APPRECIATION
(in dollars)
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TABLE 12A
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION'S IRR OF EXPECTED CASH FLOW
ZERO APPRECIATION
(in percent)
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TABLE 12B
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION'S IRR OF EXPECTED CASH FLOW
4% APPRECIATION
(in percent)
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TABLE 12C
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION'S IRR OF EXPECTED CASH FLOW
8% APPRECIATION
(in percent)
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TABLE 13A
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION'S NPV OF ACCOUNTING INCOME
ZERO APPRECIATION
(in dollars)
INITIAL AGE
65 70 75 80 tfiCO
j FH 32,498(23,213)
27,114 
(21,868)
21,618
(20,055)
16,337
(17,771)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
12,249
(1.5,712)
GR
9,83 0 
(5,830)
8,073
(5,200)
6,497
(4,627)
5,142
(4,116)
4.157 
(3,758)
SI 22,021 20,372 18,220 14,270 11,297
(21,166) (24,097) (28,128) (33,965) (40,465)
SL 30,184 (25,343)
31,242
(27,745) (31,640)
26,882
(37,6.14)
23,295
(44,426)
FH 32,356(27,186)
25,444
(23,692)
19,218
(20,254)
13,833 
(16,811)
9,959 
(14,104 )
GR
9,320
(6,958)
7, 17 3 
(5,419)
5,471
(4,471)
4,131
(3,708)
3,21.7 
(3,197)
; si 26,887(19,156)
22,710 
(19,500)
18,496
(20,703)
13,4.23
(23,633)
9,816
(27,678)
j i 32,4571 SL 1 j_______ j (18,864)
30,565
(18,573)
27,465
(21,273)
22,502
(25,463)
18,273 
(30,326) j
All NPVs are significantly different from zero (p = .01)
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TABLE 13B
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION'S NPV OF ACCOUNTING INCOME
4% APPRECIATION
(in dollars)
r  " - INITIAL AGE
=s===ss===s==========n
65
, -
70
_
75 80 ! 85 j
F" * 8®a“
FH 32,498(23,213)
27,114 
(21,868)
21,618 
(20,055)
16.337
(17,771)
12,249 | I(15,712)
ER0
GR 9, 880 (5,830)
8,073
(5,200)
6,497 
(4,6e / )
5,142 
(4,116)
4,157 | 
(3,758) |
T SI 19,822 21,601 21,927 19,426 16,742
AX (25,021) (27,133) (30,510) (35,655) (41,383)
SL 19,881(29,934)
23,530
(31,542)
25,171
(34,686)
23,261
(40,019)
21f 059 
(46,233)
34 FH 32,356(27,186)
25,444
(23,692)
19,218
(20,254)
13,833
(16,811)
9,959 
(14,104 )
P! E I R
c
GR 9,320(6,598)
7, 173 
(5,419)
5,471
(4,471)
4, 131 
(3/708)
3,217 
(3,197)
EtlT SI
24,248 
(16,755)
23,321
(18,231)
21,257
(20,517)
17,304
(24,048)
13,840
(27,995)
TA SL
_ ____
22,546
(20,656)
23,512 
(21,572)
n "• t o 7A. ,i~ / « f
(23,689)
19,531
(27,411)
16,477
(31,799)
Standard'"' Jeviation is xn parentheses7
All NPVs are significantly different from zero (p = .01).
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TABLE 13C
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION'S NPV OF ACCOUNTING INCOME
8% APPRECIATION
(in dollars)
155
pi s
-a > 
mo
TABLE 14
FHA'S NPV OF EXPECTED CASH FLOW 
(in dollars)
Significantly different from zero (p = .05 one tail) Significantly different from zero (p = .01 one tail)
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TABLE 15
FHA BREAK-EVEN RETURN ON INVESTMENTS 
(in percent)
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TABLE 16
EFFECT OF DISCOUNT RATE ON FHA'S EXPECTED NPV
(in dollars)
DISCOUNT RATE EXPECTED NPV
0 .0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2 .0%
2.5%
3.0%
3.5%
4.0%
4.5%
5.0%
5.5%
5.8%
6.0%
6.5%
7.0%
7.5%
8.0%
8.3%
8.5%
9.0%
9.5%
10.0%
-9,215 
-7,729 
-6,436 
-5,311 
-4,329 
-3,474 
-2,728 
-2,076 
-1,508 
- 1,011 
-576 
-197 
8
135 
426 
680 
902 
1,096 
1,200 
1,265 
1,413 
1,542 
1, 655
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TABLE 17
EFFECT OF MOVE-OUT RATE ON FHA'S EXPECTED NPV
MOVE-OUT RATE EXPECTED NPV
.(percent of mortality) (in dollars)
0 728
5 759
10 911
15 968
20 1,009
25 1,104
3 0 1,200
35 1,298
40 1,443
45 1,556
50 1,631
55 1,701
60 1,784
65 1,885
70 1,985
75 2,103
80 2,216
85 2,332
90 2 ,403
95 2,472
100 2,529
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EFFECT OF SALES PRICE DISCOUNT ON FHA'S EXPECTED NPV
DISCOUNT EXPECTED NPV
(percent of FMV1 fin dollars)
TABLE 18
0 1,200
1 1,115
2 1,030
3 944
4 859
5 774
6 678
7 571
8 464
9 157
10 250
11 142
12 35
18 -88
14 -216
15 -345
16 -473
17 -602
18 -730
19 -864
20 -1,029
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EFFECT OF HOME APPRECIATION RATE ON FHA'S EXPECTED NPV
(in dollars)
APPRECIATION RATE EXPECTED NPV
TABLE 19
-4.0% -12,537
-3.5% -11,779
-3.0% -11,089
-2.5% -10,353
-2.0% -9,562
-1.5% -8,749
-1.0% -7,926
-0.5% -7,039
0.0% -6,156
0.5% -5,243
1.0% -4,307
1.5% -3,371
2.0% -2,419
2.5% -1,441
3.0% -520
3.3% 16
3.5% 193
4.0% 1,200
4.5% 1,926
5.0% 2,527
5.5% 2,955
6.0% 3,232
6.5% 3,365
7.0% 3,401
7.5% 3,405
8.0% 3,405
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TABLE 20
EFFECT OF APPRECIATION'S STANDARD DEVIATION ON FHA'S
EXPECTED NPV 
(in dollars)
STANDARD DEVIATION EXPECTED NPV
0.0% 1,200
0.5% 1,146
1.0% 1,001
1.5% 775
2.0% 500
2.5% 199
2.8% 13
3.0% -112
3.5% -425
4.0% -735
4.5% -1,038
5.0% -1,330
5.5% -1,609
6.0% -1,873
6.5% -2,121
7.0% -2,353
7.5% -2,569
8.0% -2,771
8.5% -2,958
9.0% -3,132
9.5% -3,294
10.0% -3,444
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION
This chapter is divided in three parts: (1) a summary of
the research, (2) public policy recommendations, and (3) 
limitations of the model, suggesting areas of further 
research.
5 * 1 Summary
As expected, this research demonstrates that none of the 
plans are Pareto optimal. For example, each of the plans had 
the highest and the lowest net present value for some 
homeowners. This suggests that none of the plans should be 
prohibited or discouraged. The most significant finding of 
the study is that neither the SI or SL is an effective 
economic substitute for the FHA HECM. Although the SI and SL 
are profitable for financial, institutions, their profits are 
more than offset by additional costs to the homeowner and, in 
the case of the SL, the FHA. Financial institutions may be 
reluctant to pass on any excess cash flow to the homeowner due 
to the high variance of expected returns. Although these two 
plans have features that may make them more desirable to the 
homeowner then the HECM, they consistently have a higher 
expected cost (as measured by NPV) than the HECM.
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5.1.1 Homeowners
The effects of the homeowner's age, expected home 
appreciation rate, and tax rate on plan choice are 
unexpectedly small* In general, most homeowners can expect to 
be better off not using a HEC plan than using one. If the 
homeowner requires a HEC plan, a mortgage plan provides the 
highest expected NPV and the growth mortgage generally 
provides the highest expected NPV.
5.1*2 Adverse Selection
The research suggests that the FHA need not be concerned 
that homeowners will use the HECM if they expect their homes 
not to increase in value. Most homeowners would be better off 
not using a HEC plan, even if they assumed that the property 
would not appreciate at all. Homeowners at age 65 or 70 who 
pay no tax or at age 65 in the 15 percent tax bracket have a 
slightly better than 50 percent chance of being better off by 
using the standard HECM. However, the benefits are too 
speculative and for too narrow a group to present a 
significant problem. It is likely that homeowners in lower 
tax brackets would be less likely to speculate than those in 
higher tax brackets. Although this addresses the adverse 
selection risk of homeowner speculation, it does not address 
Speare's (1992) concern that those homeowners that need home 
equity conversion are the ones most likely to live in
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neighborhoods with home appreciation rates below the national 
average.
5.1.3 Tax Policy
From the standpoint of tax policy, the results show that
any tax effect is not significant enough to influence a 
decision either by the homeowner or a financial institution. 
There is less incentive for a homeowner to enter a HEC plan as 
tax rates increase, indicating that the HEC plans are 
consistent with vertical equity. In addition, the specific 
tests for vertical integration and tax subsidy indicate there 
is no violation of these tax policy principles.
5.1*4 Accounting Policy
At first glance, the accounting treatment of the SI and 
the SL under current rules do not appear to fully reflect the 
economics of their respective transactions. This suggests 
that financial institutions may be reluctant to enter into 
these arrangements, particularly if they were concerned with 
maintaining regulatory income and capital. However, the 
results of this research show that given a large portfolio of 
investments, the accounting flows from the portfolio should be 
large enough not to discourage the investments in the plans. 
The NPV of expected accounting income of the SI and the SL is 
consistently higher than the NPV of expected cash flow. This 
indicates that accounting flows generally precede cash flow. 
5.1.5 FHA Assumptions
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Although many of the FHA assumptions appear generous, 
they do not appear to be more generous than the assumptions 
used in other HEC plans. The liberal assumptions are in part 
driven by the FHA policy not to profit by its plan. This 
policy permits the FHA little leeway for errors in their 
assumptions. This research shows that FHA met its goal by 
being marginally profitable, excluding administrative costs, 
based on its assumptions. The simulations indicate that it is 
not likely that a violation of any assumption tested will by 
itself cause a loss. However, a change in the appreciation 
rate to below 3.3 percent or the standard deviation of the 
appreciation rate (assuming a 4 percent average rate) to more 
than 2.8 percent would result in a loss. This research 
assumes that the FHA could fund their premiums with 
investments with the same return as the mortgages. If the 
returns are significantly (about 2.5 percentage points) below 
that of the mortgages, then the FHA will incur a loss. 
Homeowner move-out rates do not have a significant effect on 
the model. Even if the move-out rate is zero, the FHA still 
has a margin of profit. The low significance of the move-out 
rate suggests that the FHA need not stringently enforce 
repayment upon move-out. In fact, it may consider loosening 
it rules to permit the loan to remain in effect after move- 
out* This will allow the homeowner to use rents from the 
house to provide additional income for long term care.
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5-2 Recommendations
5-2.1. FHA Recommendations
The results show that neither the SI or the SL is 
expected to result in a NPV to the homeowner that is as 
favorable as a mortgage plan. In addition, the SL is 
unprofitable for the FHA. This suggests that the FHA should 
not insure the SL plan. Insuring the SI plan under the terms 
of this research would impose no additional cost to the FHA 
(since the insurance is based on the standard HECM mortgage). 
However, the need for the insurance can be questioned. The 
plan is not particularly beneficial to the homeowner and it is 
unclear whether financial institutions would be interested in 
this form of insurance.
The FHA should institute a growth mortgage option. This 
would provide inflation protection to the homeowner and is 
profitable for the FHA. The growth option could be changed to 
a cost of living option. Although the FHA will bear the risk 
of higher inflation, this should be more than offset by 
reduced home appreciation rate risk. Over time, homes tend to 
appreciate with inflation.
5.2*2 Public Assistance Recommendations
Even though the SI and SL plans are not sufficiently 
beneficial to the homeowner to encourage financial 
institutions to offer them, uninsured plans should not be 
discouraged. For example, Congress or the Social Security
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Administration should consider establishing rules that allow 
elderly homeowners to convert their home equity into an 
annuity without affecting their SSI payments. There appears 
to be no policy reason for allowing HECM mortgage payments to 
be exempt from the income rules while annuity payments are 
not. This is clearly a question of "form over substance." An 
exemption for home equity conversion should also produce more 
liquidity in the housing market since the elderly would not be 
forced to stay in their home in order to continue SSI 
benefits.
5.2.3 Tax Recommendations
Both the SI and SL have unneeded tax clouds over their 
heads. These are clouds that the Treasury Department has 
indicated a willingness to change. Consistent with this 
Treasury Department policy, Congress should amend section 125 
to allow the $125,000 exemption for the sale of a remainder 
interest to an unrelated party. The transaction would be 
treated as the sale of the entire property followed by a buy­
back of the life estate. In addition, a sale-leaseback of a 
residence to an unrelated party should be recognized as such, 
regardless of the term of the lease.
5.3 Limitations
The limitations of this research are a result of the 
assumptions used in the model and the FHA model. Further 
research is needed to test the appropriateness of the model
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assumptions. For -example, both the FHA model and this 
research assume that life expectancy can be estimated by the 
HEW life expectancy tables. Almost all commentators have been 
critical of this assumption. In addition, FHA does not use 
joint life tables for joint owners. Joint owners were not 
included in this study because the effect of a joint owner's 
death on the move-out and mortality of the other joint owner 
is not known. Further research is necessary on the actual 
life expectancy of homeowners using home equity conversion as 
well as the effect of the death of one owner on the mortality 
and move-out rate of the survivor. The HECM program may be 
unprofitable if the FHA mortality assumptions are too liberal, 
particularly if the average initial age of the borrowers 
should decrease. This research suggests that the FHA's 
expected profit from a HECM mortgage is lower for younger 
borrowers.
Virtually all current FHA HECM mortgages have a variable 
interest rate. To avoid confounding, this research does not 
explore the effect of variable rates on the homeowner or the 
FHA. There is a need for further research in this area. For 
example, does the FHA's method of computing annuity payments 
for variable mortgages result in a subsidy to the homeowner?
This study only analyzed the sensitivity of the tenure 
mortgage to the FHA assumptions. Further research is
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necessary to explore the sensitivity of the line of credit and 
term mortgages to the assumptions.
The SI and SL plans protect the homeowner against 
unforseen expenses (e.g., a new roof) . This is a risk that is 
not measured by the methodology of this research* Further 
research is necessary to find if the problem is significant 
and if so develop methods to protect homeowners using the 
HECM. For example, some other HECM products require the 
homeowner to leave a reserve for repairs.
This research model assumes that the homeowner will 
continue the mortgage until death or move-out* Further 
research is needed to develop costs and benefits to the 
homeowner, the financial institution, and the FHA for either 
refinancing at lower interest rates or refinancing if the 
property appreciates more than expected in the FHA model.
Financial institutions may elect to "put" the mortgage to 
the FHA when the mortgage equals 98 percent of the maximum 
claim amount. This study assumes that the interest rate 
remains constant and that the financial institution will elect 
o (3 o n I*. nu d 37 5^ • fu r 17 r ^2 s* 37 jsi
necessary as to the interest rate exposure of the FHA relating 
to this put.
The simulation of the SI and SL assumed that homeowners 
would not use the plan as a device for selling their homes.
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If either of these plans are developed, specific provisions 
would have to be included to avoid this problem*
Finally, the test of the FHA model examined a single 
parameter at a time. Further research is necessary to 
determine the joint risk of changes in more than one 
parameter.
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